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Abstract
Previous work on the empirical distribution of security returns has found that equity returns
are not normally distributed. These findings have brought the applicability of certain asset
allocation and pricing frameworks into question. This study examines whether the removal of
a priori macro-outliers and micro-outliers leads to improved fits to the Gaussian distribution
for single-listed equities on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). Single-listed equities
refer to stocks (i) listed on the JSE Main Board over the period covered in this study, (ii)
that comprise of the exchange’s largest 100 stocks by market capitalisation, and (iii) have
been determined, by comparing American Depository Receipt (ADR) trading volume to JSE
trading volume, to be mainly exposed to the South African market. Regarding the predeter-
mined outliers, the study categorises macro-outliers as days related to predictable market
announcements which are US nonfarm payrolls announcement days. Similarly, micro-outliers
are classified as days linked to predictable sector-specific and firm-specific news, which are
sectoral announcement, and company earnings announcement days, respectively. The study
aims to contribute to the empirical and theoretical literature on the distributional properties
of South African equity returns.
This study makes use of a filter to narrow the sample of stocks for empirical investigation
over the period from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2017, and analyses daily stock returns
on a 65-day rolling basis. Using only those equities, an evaluation of the goodness-of-fit
methodology is conducted using graphical methods, and statistical goodness-of-fit tests sorted
into (i) empirical distribution function, (ii) regression and correlation, and (iii) moment
tests. It is found that the majority of the data exhibits significant departures from normality
in empirical distribution function, and regression and correlation tests. The results were
statistically significant at three confidence levels. However, in the case of moment tests, the
results show a clear divergence between the methods. It is further demonstrated that while the
daily stock returns have improved fits to the normal distribution, they remain predominantly
positively-skewed and thick-tailed even after the removal of the a priori outliers. On this
basis, it is argued that some downside risk measures, and asset allocation frameworks may
not be applicable in the South African context.
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1 Introduction
The standard Gaussian distribution is the most widely used distribution in classical statistics
and has applications in computer science, ecology and chemistry (Crow and Shimizu, 1987).
In financial economics, normality is an assumption that underpins several asset pricing
models including the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Treynor, 1962; Sharpe, 1964;
Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966) and the Black-Scholes options pricing model (Black and Scholes,
1973). As such, there has been extensive investigation into the propriety of this assumption
(Fama, 1965; Clark, 1973; Fama, 1976; Bookstaber and McDonald, 1987; Affleck-Graves and
McDonald, 1989). With reference to equity returns, the subsequent conclusion drawn from
the aforementioned literature is that returns do not follow a Gaussian distribution; thus, it
casts doubt on results that depend primarily on this assumption.
The distribution of stock returns has been widely researched in empirical research (Lux,
1996; Mandelbrot, 1997; Gopikrishnan et al., 2000; Gabaix et al., 2003; Farmer and Lillo,
2004). This has increasingly become of interest to academics and investment professionals
due to the 2008 Great Recession, which saw investors experiencing higher likelihoods of
suffering significant losses relative to what conventional asset pricing models would suggest. In
modelling the estimated frequency of “bank failures”, Goldman Sachs abandoned the normal
distribution to model non-crisis states in the markets in favour of a lognormal distribution
(Strongin et al., 2014). With respect to downside risk, this implies asymmetry with the stock
return distribution (Xiong, 2010).
As a persistent concern in empirical finance research, outliers (which are observations that
deviate significantly from the data) are known to have the power to yield misrepresentative
descriptive statistics and/or biased coefficient estimates in least-squares regressions (Edge-
worth, 1887; Adams et al., 2014). The purpose of this study is to explore whether removing
predictable macro-outliers and micro-outliers from daily JSE stock return data will result
in improved goodness-of-fit to the Gaussian distribution. By extension, the equities are
expected to demonstrate lower and more symmetric standard deviations. These outliers
will be categorised as: (i) “red letter days”, which refers to days of planned information
releases within the financial markets; and (ii) “blue letter days”, which are days relating to
pre-determined firm-specific and/or sector-specific news. The details of each category will be
explained further in the study.
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Extensive research has been conducted on the normality of stock returns and the postu-
lated empirical distribution thereof. As such, there are varying opinions on the distribution
of stock returns; however, there is little to no literature investigating this in the South
African context. Bowie and Bradfield (1993) and Tolikas (2011) however find that South
African daily stock returns are highly leptokurtic and demonstrate significant deviations
from normality. Additionally, although the normality hypothesis is rejected by Prakash et al.
(2003) and Chión et al. (2008) this study may deliver interesting results in the South African
market environment, especially with the removal of a priori macro-outliers and micro-outliers.
This study is conducted in an attempt to contribute to the literature on the distributional
properties of South African single-listed equities after the 2008 Great Recession. Furthermore,
there are fewer studies locally, relative to those conducted in offshore markets, which detail
the effect of predetermined macro-outliers and micro-outliers on security prices and returns
(Jefferis and Smith, 2005; Yartey and Adjasi, 2007; Mlonzi et al., 2011; Afego, 2013).
The objective of this study is to determine whether removing a priori macro-outliers and
micro-outliers creates improved fits to the Gaussian distribution. This will be done using
graphical methods, including density histograms. Additionally, five goodness-of-fit tests
will be implemented to support the graphical methods. These tests are categorised into (i)
empirical distribution function, (ii) regression and correlation, and (iii) moment tests. These
tests will be used to determine which equities have returns that are not statistically significant,
and can be concluded that normality is a reasonable assumption for them. This will be
carried out using a sample of data from the South African equity market that comprises of
single-listed stocks. The research conducted by Peiro (1994), Prakash et al. (2003) and Chión
et al. (2008) used the goodness-of-fit methodology to test for normality. The contribution
of this study will also determine whether the results are consistent with the international
research. It must be highlighted that a sampling filter is applied in this study, which is a
similar approach to that proposed by Van Rensburg (2002).
The rest of the dissertation is organised as follows: Chapter 2 presents the existing body
of theoretical and empirical literature; Chapter 4 describes the research methodology;
Chapter 5 demonstrates the findings from the quantitative analysis and lastly, Chapter
6 concludes the study and discusses the scope for future research. The technicalities and
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considerations of the data are outlined in Chapter 3.
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2 Literature Review
Economic and financial theories fundamentally depend on a particular parameterisation of
the distributions of which their parameters are meant to illustrate the “macroscopic” entities
that economic and/or market participants are sensitive to (Malevergne et al., 2005). As such,
this chapter will present the relevant literature. It must be emphasised that the amount of
empirical and theoretical research in this field does not permit for an exhaustive assessment
of all the facets of the literature.
Section 2.1 will provide an outline of the asset pricing environment and background to
the various asset return distributions, then the evidence from the JSE will be presented
in Section 2.2. The aspects relating to the impact of non-normality on risk management
and volatility will discussed in Section 2.3, then Section 2.4 will explain the a priori
macro-outliers and micro-outliers in detail. Additionally, the subsequent empirical evaluation
of the various normality measures will be reviewed in Section 2.5.
2.1 Return Distributions in Empirical Finance
In the existing body of finance literature, the Gaussian distribution has been regarded as the
sine qua non for theoretical and empirical methods whilst also assuming that its parameters
are stationary over time. Kon (1984) states that the axioms of normality and parameter
stationarity forms the basis of the econometric techniques that are conventionally used in
quantitative research. Krishnamoorthy (2006) states that a random variable X follows a
Gaussian/normal distribution and is thus defined by the probability density function





], −∞<x<∞, −∞<µ<∞, σ> 0 (1)
where µ represents the mean and σ represents the standard deviation. The Gaussian
distribution is frequently denoted by N(µ, σ2). Additionally, the cumulative distribution
function is described by





The normal random variable with µ = 0 and σ = 1 is known as the standard normal random
variable, and its cumulative distribution function is represented by Φ(z). Keeping (1962)
and Krishnamoorthy (2006) state that if X is a normal random variable with mean µ and
standard deviation σ, then








)dt = Φ(x− µ
σ
). (3)
The mean serves as the location parameter, and the standard deviation is the scale parameter.
The Gaussian distribution function is symmetric and mesokurtic, which implies that γ1(X) =
0 and γ2(X) = 3, respectively. This also represents perfect goodness-of-fit for several financial
time series.
Nevertheless, the underlying assumption of normality in trading volume and asset returns
has been disputed. It must be noted that most conventional periods of trading may justify
the normality assumption, but Bohrmann (2014) highlights that the tails of the empirical
distribution display significant departures from normality. Equivalently, McDonald (1996)
states that higher values of kurtosis are prevalent in financial return data. A distribution with
γ2(X) less than 3 is said to be platykurtic; conversely, a leptokurtic distribution has a γ2(X)
greater than 3 (Stuart and Ord, 1987). As such, these tails (commonly referred to as “fat tails”
or “heavy tails”) include a higher number of events in comparison to the Gaussian distribution.
Furthermore, Xiong (2010) argues that the Gaussian distribution model assumes that a stock
return that lies three standard deviations (typically referred to as a “three-sigma event”)
below its mean has a 0.13% likelihood of occuring. However, between January 1926 and April
2009, the S&P 500 demonstrated a monthly mean return and standard deviation of 0.91%
and 5.55%, respectively. Also, the literature (ibid.) states that the abovementioned index
would incur a monthly loss of 15.74% due to a negative three-sigma event; however, the S&P
500 experienced ten monthly returns that exceeded this amount. This further implies that,
from operating on a Gaussian distribution model, the likelihood of a three-sigma event is
eight times greater than an investor would expect. As such, the standard normal distribution
fails to explain the fat tails of plausible asset returns (Bohrmann, 2014).
The genesis of research into the distribution of asset returns is linked to Bachelier (Davis et al.,
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2011) where the underlying assumption of normality in asset returns was originally proposed.
Essentially, if transactions can be assumed to be independent and identically distributed
random variables with finite variances, then it can be demonstrated via the Central Limit
Theorem that, over longer horizons, the aggregate number of independent random variables
will tend towards normality (Fama, 1963; Harris and Küçüközmen, 2001; Bohrmann, 2014).
“Brownian motion”, originally used in physics to illustrate the irregular motion of particles
of matter suspended in a fluid or gas, was also implemented in finance to describe stock
market movements by Osborne (1959). The literature further states price movements are
independent and the sizes of those fluctuations followed a Gaussian distribution.
Mandelbrot (1963) made a pioneering contribution through concluding that the “empirical
distributions of price changes are usually too ’peaked’ to be relative to samples from Gaussian
populations.” Essentially, the literature (ibid.) regarded Brownian motion to not necessarily
be applicable to stock price changes at all times because the tails of the empirical distribution
are greater than those of the Gaussian distribution. It may be highlighted that, by assuming
Brownian motion, the stock prices ought to follow a normal distribution (Osborne, 1959).
Moreover, Mandelbrot (1963) proposed a new model of price movements called “stable
Paretian distributions” and implemented the model to cotton price changes which showed
that, in the tails, the Gaussian distribution is inappropriate. This class of distributions is
defined by the logarithm of the characteristic function as










−1, ω(t, α) = tan(πα/2) if α 6= 1, ω(t, α) = (2log|t|)/π if α = 1 and α, β, c
and δ are parameters associated with the first four moments of the distribution (Fama,
1963; Peiro, 1994). The magnitude of the tails of the distribution are reflected in the
characteristic exponent, α, which validates 0 < α ≤ 2. Therefore, the stable Paretian dis-
tribution becomes a N(δ, 2c2) distribution when α = 2. Also, the variance infinite when α < 2.
Following Mandelbrot’s research, Fama (1963) investigated the validity of the stable Paretian
hypothesis as its veracity bears significant consequences on the fundamental understanding
of speculative markets and the appropriate statistical methods concerning speculative prices.
Moreover, Fama (1965) surveyed the thirty stocks of the Dow Jones Industrial Average
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(DJIA) and confirmed the hypothesis that a stable Paretian distribution with α < 2 actually
illustrates asset returns better relative to a Gaussian distribution. The literature further
states that the standard deviation of the latter distribution understates the risk of stocks.
Furthermore, Aparicio and Estrada (2001) argue that if stock returns emulate a stable
Paretian distribution and the variance is infinite, then the conventional statistical methods
may provide fallacious answers.
The above literature demonstrates the importance of retaining the tail data, even when it
is does not follow a Gaussian distribution. The main reason behind this is that the tail
events are the most important occurrences for an investor to be circumspect of and prepare
accordingly. Xiong (2010) emphasises that these kind of events are the stock market crashes
linked to the Great Depression, Great Recession and the consequent failure of the stock
market after the demise of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998.
Although power laws are not explicitly mentioned by Mandelbrot (1963), the model is premised
on the “stable Paretian” class of probability laws; notwithstanding that the standard normal
distribution is a special form of a stable distribution. However, Gabaix (2009) notes that
other non-Gaussian kinds of stable distributions resemble power law distributions with heavy
tails. In essence, non-Gaussian extreme events follow a power law distribution. Literature on
power law distributions comes from an emerging field of “econophysics”, a term referring to
the utilisation of mechanisms created for physics in economics (Plerou et al., 2000). While
valid, the arguments proposed by Mandelbrot (1963), Fama (1965), Aparicio and Estrada
(2001), and Gabaix (2009) fall outside the scope of this dissertation.
Despite the wealth of literature invalidating the normal distribution, there is still no general
consensus on the empirical distribution of stock returns. Furthermore, abandoning the
normal distribution as a primary model assumption would mean that alternative asset pricing
models will be needed to replace the existing ones, including the mean-variance analysis
(Markowitz, 1952) and CAPM. However, the explicit and implicit costs involved in switching
from the normal distribution to adopting the hypothetical Paretian distributions may exceed
the prospective gains. This may also mean that the Gaussian distribution has a “lock-in”
effect in the financial markets; therefore, there is a quasi-irreversibility of investment in the
asset pricing models that are premised on the abovementioned distribution (David, 1985).
Additionally, the technical interrelatedness of these models ensures that researchers and
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market participants continue to derive generalised increasing returns from using the Gaussian
distribution as a fundamental assumption in financial economics (ibid.).
It is critical to note that this study will examine whether the daily return distribution of
South African equities will demonstrate improved fits to normality. This consequently implies
that if the hypothesis is true at a pre-specified confidence level, then the various indicators
and models (viz. the Sharpe Ratio) will become more reliable when applied to financial time
series.
2.2 Normality of Returns on the JSE
Gilbertson and Roux (1977, 1978) pioneered the research into the return distribution of the
JSE and discovered significant departures from normality. This literature also found that
the empirical distribution for JSE returns was more leptokurtic relative to that of the New
York Stock Exchange. This therefore means that there is a higher likelihood of large price
movements occurring in the tails of the abovementioned empirical distribution than implied
by the Gaussian distribution. In an analysis of measuring security price performance, Page
(1993) attempted to explore the statistical features of JSE stock returns. The study confirmed
the existence of non-normal return behaviour in 244 equities traded from February 1973 to
March 1992. Furthermore, the literature used a wide variety of normality tests to arrive at
the aforementioned conclusion; notwithstanding that 54 stocks in the sample were frequently
traded.
In the post-Apartheid South African literature, Chen et al. (2003) use JSE monthly stock
return data spanning from 25 August 1988 to 24 July 1999 to derive the distribution of security
returns in an “upgraded” market. This study assumes that the stock market proxy follows a
combination of Gaussian distributions. As such, it concludes that security returns follow a
skew-normal distribution. Additionally, Jefferis and Smith (2005) found that weekly JSE
security returns demonstrate significant deviations from normality, and similar to Gilbertson
and Roux (1977, 1978), the empirical distributions were heavy-tailed.
Mangani (2007) investigated the distributional properties of 42 JSE security prices and
returns using weekly data covering the period from 28 February 1973 to 5 April 2002. The
literature (ibid.) replicated the approach used by Page (1993) and performed the Jarque-Bera
normality tests. As such, the study (ibid.) reported unambiguous evidence of leptokurtosis,
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and the unequivocal rejection of the normality hypothesis which supports the international
evidence (Mandelbrot, 1963; Fama, 1965) as well as the JSE (Gilbertson and Roux, 1977,
1978; Page, 1993; Chen et al., 2003; Jefferis and Smith, 2005). Lastly, Tolikas (2011) explored
the asymptotic distribution of the extreme daily security returns in four African markets
over the period from 1996 to 2007. Moreover, the study concludes that JSE extreme daily
stock returns exhibit significant non-Gaussian behaviour, and heavy tails. These findings are
consistent with the abovementioned literature.
There appears to be a consensus in the related literature that South African stock returns,
especially daily and weekly returns, are not normally distributed. They also demonstrate sig-
nificant leptokurtosis. Consequently, joint multivariate normality is an unrealistic assumption
for modelling JSE returns. It is also important to note that the Gaussianity of individual
stock returns is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the joint multivariate normality
of all the returns (Kon, 1984; Richardson and Smith, 1993). Therefore, the non-normality of
the stock returns brings the applicability of certain asset pricing models (including CAPM)
to South African stock market into question. Furthermore, the abovementioned evidence
affects downside risk measures which will be discussed in the next section.
The international and local literature assessed in this chapter either aims to (i) determine an
official empirical distribution of stock returns, or (ii) explain the distributional properties
of stock returns across several developed, emerging, and/or frontier markets. This study
separates itself from the abovementioned research by investigating whether the removal of a
priori macro-outliers and micro-outliers can result in improved fits to the normal distribution.
The removal of red letter days allows academics and practitioners to understand the impact
of US nonfarm payroll days on stock returns and whether the events expose South African
stocks to increased downside risk. Equivalently, the removal of blue letter days in the study
demonstrates the effect of sectoral news and company earnings announcements on equity
returns, especially for single-listed stocks of companies that may have limited presence in
other markets via American Depository Receipts (ADRs). Therefore, this study serves to
equip practitioners with the knowledge on how the presence of heavy tails and skewness
may compromise or benefit their investments in single-listed stocks, and expose financial
institutions and regulators to increased downside risk.
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2.3 Normality and Downside Risk
As intricate systems with interwoven components, financial markets can be split into two
groups: (i) the traders, which include individual investors, mutual funds, brokerage firms and
banks, and (ii) the assets, which include bonds, equities, futures and options. As previously
discussed, the presence of fat tails in the empirical distribution of stock returns implies a
higher likelihood of large price movements. Bekaert et al. (1998) argues that the above-
mentioned observation is more pronounced in emerging markets relative to developed ones
which may be attributed to liquidity issues, and other market inefficiencies. Consequently,
investment professionals are interested in large price changes as these can decimate investment
performance and value.
In the context of this study, the occurrence of extreme values can significantly diminish the
advantages of risk diversification. Since assets become highly correlated during a market crash,
it is therefore difficult to diversify away linked to extreme price changes. As such, the Bank for
International Settlements and other financial regulators have also demonstrated their interest
in determining the likelihood of large financial losses, and protecting the financial market
system from such events (Tolikas, 2011). This therefore means that financial institutions
are required to abide to capital adequacy requirements, which would insulate the financial
market system from the probability of large losses owing to extreme events. In South Africa,
the likelihood of extreme events occurring can have significant ramifications on economic
development as stock markets are the main driver of growth for local firms (Alfaro et al.,
2004; Ang and McKibbin, 2007).
Financial market volatility can result in severe consequences for the world economy as depicted
by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, and 2008 Great Recession. Volatility refers to a measure
of the average changes of market value over a specific time interval T, which is important
as it gauges the risk relating to assets (Cizeau et al., 1997). However, Poon and Granger
(2003) emphasises that volatility and risk are not the same. The former can be interpreted
as uncertainty and used as an essential input to several investment choices and portfolio
creations; the latter is often associated with small or negative returns. As such, individual
and institutional investors and portfolio managers can tolerate certain risk levels, which
implies that good volatility forecasts play an integral role in assessing investment risk.
In conventional finance theory, volatility is regarded as the standard deviation, σ, or variance,
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(Rt − R̄)2 (5)
where R̄ is the average return and σ̂ represents the sample standard deviation, which is a
distribution-free parameter. The necessary probability density and cumulative probability
density function can only be attained analytically if σ is linked to a standard distribution such
as the Gaussian or Student’s t distribution (Keeping, 1962). However, this view has evolved
with the developments in statistics. Nonetheless, σ is an accurate measure of dispersion for
a limited number of distributions, which has led to the suggestion of alternative measures
including the inter-quantile range (Mittnik and Paolella, 2003; Poon and Granger, 2003).
Furthermore, the empirical violation of the normality assumption in asset returns arguably
limits the use of σ in isolation; however, it does imply that downside risk measures in
heavy-tailed distributions needs to be investigated as investors exhibit loss aversion (Box,
1953; Ang et al., 2006; Rosenberg and Schuermann, 2006). Semivariance is proposed by
Markowitz (1991) as it utilises the squares of returns below the mean; however, it is a difficult
measure to use in constructing portfolios.
Downside risk measures are defined as “measures of ’the distance’ between a risky situation
and the corresponding risk-free situation when only unfavourable discrepancies contribute to
the ‘risk’” (Dhaene et al., 2003). Ang et al. (2006) and Danielsson et al. (2006) attribute the
early literature on downside risk measures to Roy (1952) where the “safety first” rule was
forwarded. Given the renewed interest in downside risk measures and heavy-tail distributions,
modern concepts including Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES) have been used
for financial risk management and macroprudential regulation (Danielsson et al., 2006). VaR
refers to the maximum loss that can occur during certain periods of time (usually one or ten
days) given a specific confidence level (either one- or five-percent critical value); thus, it is a
conditional quantile of the asset return loss distribution (Jorion, 1996). Gençay et al. (2003)
and Rosenberg and Schuermann (2006) formally define Yt as the portfolio value at time t,
and k-period-ahead portfolio return as rt+k = ln(Yt+k)− ln(Yt). Therefore, at a (1 − α)%
quantile, V aRt+k(α) is estimated at time t for a k-period-ahead return as
Pr
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Since 1988, the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision1 has required VaR to become a key
market risk management tool for financial institutions. Huisman et al. (1998) presents VaR-x,
which factors the apparent tail fatness in asset returns into the VaR approximation, which
improves the quality of the estimates. In the case of heavy-tailed distributions, the Extreme
Value Theory will need to be incorporated in improving VaR estimations due to VaR focusing
mainly on the asset return distribution in the tail; notwithstanding that this sentiment is
supported by Danielsson and De Vries (2000), Xiong and Idzorek (2011), and Abad et al.
(2014). Basel Committee (2012) has since released Fundamental Review of the Trading Book
where “a shift from Value-at-Risk (VaR) to an Expected Shortfall (ES) measure of risk under
stress” is mentioned. Expected Shortfall provides a more prudent estimate of “tail risk” for
heavy-tailed distributions and Chang et al. (2016) motivates the shift as: (i) ES accounts for
losses exceeding the VaR level and demonstrates sub-addivity, whereas VaR fails to do this
and is not sub-additive; (ii) ES is mathematically-superior to VaR as it is less susceptible to
over- and under-estimating tail risk.
Conclusively, the link that risk has to the standard deviation of the empirical distribu-
tion means that any risk considerations are related to the deviations of returns from the
mean (Ang et al., 2006). As such, in the case of non-normal heavy-tailed distributions,
risk may imply the likelihood of extreme events occurring. Therefore, the invalidation of
the normality assumption means that using standard deviation as a stand-alone measure
of downside risk may be inappropriate. Furthermore, it could lead to the misestimation
of security prices, especially if the suitable distributions have three or more parameters
(Chión et al., 2008). For financial institutions and regulators, this also implies that more
rigorous risk estimates including Expected Shortfall are needed to protect the financial system.
1The Basel Committee on Bank Supervision mainly comprises of G10 countries and covers 45 institutions
from 28 jurisdictions. “BCBS” or “the Committee” will be used interchangeably from this point thereafter
(Jorion, 1996).
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2.4 Predetermined Events of Increased Market Volatility
2.4.1 Red Letter Days
In capital asset pricing theory, macroeconomic announcements are regarded as one of the
most important systematic risk factors due to the state of an economy serving as a driver of
unsystematic risk (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Esin and Gupta, 2017). Scholarly interest in
the effect of macroeconomic announcements on stock prices and other financial market vari-
ables started to grow in the 1980s. With a focus on the United States, the literature (Pearce
and Roley, 1985; Hardouvelis, 1987; Jain, 1988) assessed which kind of macroeconomic an-
nouncements had a considerable impact on asset prices. Since red letter days are premised on
pre-determined dates, the market is able to foresee these news and formulate its expectations.
Conventionally, the exact dates and times are released to the financial market community
well ahead of the time. In the US, the Bureau for Labour Statistics releases the total nonfarm
employment or “nonfarm payrolls” statistic on the first Friday of every month at 08:30
Eastern Standard Time (which would be 14:30 in South Africa) (Funke and Matsuda, 2006).
Conversely, the South African Reserve Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) convenes
six times a year on preordained dates made available to the public beforehand and releases the
Monetary Policy Statement at 15:00 Central African Time (South African Reserve Bank, n.d.).
Monthly comparisons of nonfarm payrolls are used as a measure of economic standing;
notwithstanding that it assists policymakers and the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) in assessing and predicting aggregate economic activity. Moreover, the nonfarm
payrolls represents the unemployment statistics for the US labour market, including the
labour force participation rate (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 2004). As part of the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) runs a
repurchase agreement (repo) system with an inflation targeting framework, where the repo
rate is used as the primary instrument. Essentially, the repo rate represents the rate charged
by the SARB for catering to the cash requirements of commercial banks; notwithstanding
that the Monetary Policy Statement details any adjustment to the repo rate, which is a proxy
for inflation (Mohr and Fourie, 2004; Sichei, 2005).
Theoretically, macroeconomic announcements affect stock returns if the news has an effect on
the drivers of stock prices. As such, Duffie (2010) states that asset prices (Pt) represents the
13













where τ ≥ 0 (8)
where the discount rate (rt) comprises of the risk-free rate and equity risk premium.
In an investigation of the S&P500 covering the period between 1957 and 2009, Boyd et al.
(2005) finds that on average, stock prices increase when the unemployment rate fall during
expansions, yet stock prices respond negatively to rising unemployment during contractions
in the business cycle. This supports the research conducted by McQueen and Roley (1993)
where the literature investigates the daily percentage changes of the S&P500 index from
September 1977 to May 1988. The study (ibid.) finds that the US stock prices responds
to macroeconomic announcements based on the state of the economy. The variation in
stock price reactions across different economic cycles is linked to investors needing to form
expectations about future economic activity and expected cashflows. However, these views
are challenged by Funke and Matsuda (2006) in a comparative study between US and German
stocks using daily data spanning from 1997 to 2002. The literature concluded that, at a
five percent significance level, nonfarm payrolls are not statistically significant; thus, the
indicator does not affect US stock prices. This further affirms the view held by Gilbert et al.
(2010) that equities markets overreact to the release of the nonfarm payrolls; however, Lahaye
et al. (2011) presents the evidence that the the bond markets are more responsive to the
announcements.
Nikkinen et al. (2006) investigate 35 stock market reactions to predetermined US macro-
announcements from July 1995 to March 2002. The stock markets are divided into six
groups: G7 countries, non-G7 European countries, developed and emerging Asian countries,
Latin American countries, and transition economies. The study (ibid.) concludes that the
G7 countries, non-G7 European countries, developed Asian countries, and emerging Asian
countries are closely linked to the world’s stock market as the various regions are affected by
the US macroeconomic news. Conversely, Latin American and transition economies show
that they are not impacted by the US macro-announcements; thus, the literature argues
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that the abovementioned regions are not integrated with the global stock markets. Savor
and Wilson (2013) examines the trade-off between macroeconomic risk and US financial
asset returns through prescheduled economic announcements covering the period 1958 to
2009. The literature (ibid.) finds that stock market mean excess returns are 11.4 basis
points (bp) on days when macroeconomic announcements are scheduled to be released, but
for non-announcement days, the average falls to 1.1 bp. The Sharpe ratio is ten times
higher on announcement days; notwithstanding that the difference between the average
excess returns and Sharpe ratios are much higher during periods of high risk. Consequently,
Savor and Wilson (2013) finds that investors demand higher expected returns on risky assets
as compensation for the risks linked to macroeconomic news. Stotz (2016) supports the
conclusions reached by Savor and Wilson (2013), and develops macroeconomic investment
strategies based on this using announcement days from January 1962 to February 2014.
The existing literature (Betlehem, 1972; Roome, 1986; Firer and McLeod, 1999; Jorion and
Goetzmann, 1999; Eita, 2012) examining the link between inflation and South African stock
market returns has determined that equities function as a long-term hedge against inflation.
Betlehem (1972) is regarded as the first study to assess the relationship between inflation
and stock market returns in South Africa. Using a randomly-selected sample of 20 industrial
shares from the JSE during the period 1951 to 1971, the study deduces that South African
equities were excellent hedges against inflation in the period examined; however, it must be
noted that inflation was low due to the exclusion of South Africa from the world economy.
In addition, Roome (1986) and Firer and McLeod (1999) support the deduction brought
forward by Betlehem (1972) that South African stocks serve as hedges against inflation;
notwithstanding that Firer and McLeod (1999) carried out the study over the period from
1925 to 1998.
In a study spanning from 1947 to 1996, Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) concluded that inflation
and South African stock market returns are negatively related. Furthermore, Eita (2012)
performs an econometric analysis covering the period 1980 to 2008 and finds that the results
are consistent with the abovementioned works (Betlehem, 1972; Roome, 1986; Firer and
McLeod, 1999) on South Africa; thus, inflation and stock market returns are positively related
and the causality is bi-directional when the JSE All-Share Index (ALSI) is used. Moreover, in
an event study covering from 2002 to 2011, Gupta and Reid (2013) perform an empirical test
on the sensitivity of ten industry-specific stock returns to monetary policy and macroeconomic
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news. The literature (ibid.) finds that a basis point change in the repo rate induces a fall
in the return of the several equities indices varying from 2.374 and 3.834 percent. Also, the
repo rate is statistically significant across three significance levels (α = 0.10, α = 0.05, and
α = 0.01); thus, indicating the considerable effect that the variable has on stock returns.
Additionally, using the daily JSE All-Share Index (ALSI) returns from 31 May 1994 to 8
March 2016, Esin and Gupta (2017) find that an unexpected rise in the US unemployment
rate and drop in inflation leads to a riskier South African stock market. The study (ibid.)
further states the South African stock market is less risky when the US unemployment rate
falls. Furthermore, the study deduces that the abovementioned effect is asymmetric and
favours the impact associated with the rise in US unemployment. It must be therefore be
highlighted that this relationship deteriorates the financial conditions in South Africa, and
consequently impacts the real economy negatively.
2.4.2 Blue Letter Days
Earnings announcements serve as a benchmark that can be used by the market to determine
the profitability and wealth of a firm (Mlonzi et al., 2011). Aharony and Swary (1980) argue
that earnings figures are one of the most important signalling tools in the market and the
underlying assumption behind this argument is that managers have access to material non-
public information regarding the prospects of the firms. Black (1980) furthers this argument
by emphasising that the users of financial statements anticipate earnings to be an indicator
of absolute value, rather than marginal value. In addition, Kim and Verrecchia (1991) finds
that the price movement at the time of an earnings announcement is proportional to both (i)
the unforeseen component of the announcement, and (ii) its comparative importance to the a
priori assumptions of traders. Consequently, security prices are more volatile on earnings
announcement days than on non-announcement days as the information influences the prices
after the scheduled announcement (Nikkinen and Sahlström, 2004).
Previous research (Ro, 1983; Chambers and Penman, 1984; Kross and Schroeder, 1984) has
deduced that firm size is inversely related to the absolute stock returns around the earnings
announcements day. Kross and Schroeder (1984) also found that the timing of earnings
announcements was linked to abnormal equity returns on the earnings announcement day.
Moreover, the relationship was found to be driven by whether the earnings announcement
(i) included good or bad news, (ii) was issued by a small or large company, (iii) was a
16
final or interim announcement, or (iv) included relatively bad or good news. Potter (1992)
researched the US stock market from 1979 to 1985, and found a positive relationship between
the size of institutional ownership and variation in stock prices around quarterly earnings
announcements dates when firm size is controlled. This view is supported by Bartov et al.
(2000) through investigating US listed firms from 1989 to 1993.
In a study using a very large sample of observations from the New York and American
Stock Exchange (NYSE-AMEX), Ball and Kothari (1991) present the evidence that on the
day of a quarterly earnings announcement, the average stock return rises by 0.084 percent.
Furthermore, after controlling for risk shifts, security returns increase by 0.066 percent on
the day of the announcement, which is anomalous and violates the uncertainty resolution
hypothesis (Epstein and Turnbull, 1980). Although the literature assess the UK stock market,
Ryan and Taffler (2004) find that 70 percent of all the corporate preliminary and final
earnings announcements that have been released actually lead to economically-significant
price movements ranging from -4.1 to 4.6 percent. Cheon et al. (2001) counters the US
evidence and compares the conventional NYSE, and over-the-counter NASDAQ markets.
The study reported that NASDAQ companies’ earnings announcements result in higher
abnormal returns relative to NYSE companies’ earnings announcements. This was linked to
the differences in (i) the expected earnings growth between NASDAQ and NYSE companies,
(ii) investor sensitivity to growth prospects in NASDAQ and NYSE companies, and (iii) the
pre-disclosure information environment between NASDAQ and NYSE firms. This literature
(ibid.) contrasts with the Australian evidence that larger companies significantly more
positively to earnings announcements (Chan et al., 2005).
Moreover, using the NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ exchanges, it is confirmed by Clement
et al. (2003) that earnings announcements result in an abnormal average increase of 0.73
percent in daily stock returns. However, the anomalous behaviour of stock returns after
earnings announcements (viz. post-earnings announcement drift) has been attributed to the
flaw of CAPM as an asset pricing model, biased parameter approximations of the CAPM
or to the research aims that presumed information was accessible to the market prior to
its public release (Holthausen, 1983; Foster et al., 1984; Bartov et al., 2000). Mian and
Sankaraguruswamy (2012) argue that the reaction of security prices to good news is higher
in periods of positive market sentiment; however, the stock price reaction to bad news is
higher in periods during negative sentiment. As such, the study (ibid.) found that investor
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sentiment drives stock price movements in response to company earnings announcements.
In the case of South Africa and other developing African markets, relatively few studies on
stock price reactions to earnings announcements have been conducted. As such, it must be
noted that the above evidence may not necessarily apply to African markets. In comparison
to developed markets, emerging markets tend to suffer from poor regulatory measures, low
liquidity levels, and relatively few resources are allocated to securities research and analyses
(Osei, 2002; Yartey and Adjasi, 2007). Afego (2013) investigates the security price reactions
to yearly earnings announcements on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The study (ibid.) found
that stock returns demonstrated a downward trend on the announcement day which persists
for 20 days after the release of the earnings information. Additionally, Afego (2013) at-
tributes this to private acquisitions, and possibly, insider trading on the Nigerian stock market.
Prather-Kinsey (2006) conducted a comparative study between South Africa and Mexico
for the years 1998 to 2000. The literature (ibid.) found that, on the day of the earnings
announcement, South African securities will exhibit an abnormal return of 2.63 percent,
which is statistically significant at the 99.9% confidence level. Further evidence on the South
African stock market is presented by Mlonzi et al. (2011), and the study concludes that stock
prices react negatively to earnings announcements on the JSE-AltX2. However, the study
does highlight that it used a relatively small sample (n = 34) as a caveat.
2.5 Empirical Evaluation
The assumption of normality forms the backbone of many statistical methods including
analysis of variance (ANOVA), linear regression analysis, and t-tests. As such, the vio-
lation of the normality assumption means that the interpretation and conclusions drawn
may be unreliable or invalid, in both cross-sectional and time series data (Wooldridge,
2015). In empirical research of this nature, it is important to emphasise that joint multi-
variate normality implies univariate normality, but the converse does not apply. Therefore,
the rejection of univariate normality implies that joint multivariate normality cannot be a
realistic assumption for approximating the daily return distribution of JSE stocks (Kon, 1984).
2JSE-AltX is an alternative board for small and medium-sized firms in South Africa which operates in parallel
with and is entirely owned by Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).
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Razali and Wah (2011) outlines three common methods to verify the assumption of normality:
(i) graphical methods, (ii) numerical methods, and (iii) statistical inference. Graphical
methods include histograms, stem-and-leaf plots, and quantile-quantile (QQ) plots; however,
the normal QQ plot is the most frequently used tool for verifying the normality of a sample.
The graphical methods, however, cannot be used in isolation to conclude whether a sample
of n observations is normally distributed. As such, the more formal numerical methods
and normality tests are used to support the graphical methods in drawing a conclusion
about the normality of the sample (Underhill and Bradfield, 1996). The numerical methods
incorporate skewness and kurtosis coefficients; notwithstanding that normality tests follow
formal statistical procedures to test whether the underlying distribution of a random variable
follows a Gaussian distribution (Baghban et al., 2013).
The earliest and best understood techniques to detect non-normality were performed by
Pearson (1895) through working on the skewness and kurtosis coefficients (Althouse et al.,
1998). Approximately 40 normality tests exist in the statistical literature (Dufour et al.,
1998). As such, Seier (2002) highlights that normality tests differ according to the (i) features
of the normal distribution they focus on, (ii) its distribution function, and (iii) the linearity
between the distribution of the variable and the standard normal variable, Z [as shown in
Equation (3)]. The literature (ibid.) further states that tests also vary in the level at which
they compare the empirical distribution with the Gaussian distribution, in the intricacy of
the test statistic and the style of the distribution in question. Additionally, Razali and Wah
(2011) emphasises that different normality tests may yield contradicting results; thus, the
choice of tests to be used is of paramount importance.











Normality tests can divided into four categories: chi-square type tests, moment ratio tech-
niques, tests grounded on correlation, and tests based on the empirical distribution function
(EDF) (Arshad et al., 2003). However, Park (2008) categorises the tests for normality into
two classes which are “descriptive statistics” and “theory-driven methods”. The former refers
to skewness and kurtosis coefficients, while the latter includes normality tests. Furthermore,
the normality tests that are commonly available in statistical software are the: (i) Anderson-
Darling (AD) test, (ii) Cramer Von Mises (CVM) test, (iii) D’Agostino-Pearson (DP) test,
(iv) Jarque-Bera (JB) test, (v) Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test, (vi) Lilliefors (LF) test, and
(vii) Shapiro-Wilk (SW) test (Dufour et al., 1998; Seier, 2002; Arshad et al., 2003). Following
the example of Razali and Wah (2011), the tests have been categorised into EDF, regression
and correlation, and moments tests as shown in Table 1.
EDF tests are defined as tests that are based on a measure of dissimilarity between the
empirical and hypothesised distribution (Dufour et al., 1998). Seier (2002) and Arshad
et al. (2003) argue that the most commonly known EDF tests are the Anderson-Darling,
Cramer Von Mises, Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Lilliefors tests. Regression and correlation
tests are described by Dufour et al. (1998) as tests that are based on a ratio of two weighted
least-squares (WLS) approximations of scale derived from order statistics. In other words, the
approximations are the normally distributed WLS estimates and the sample variance from
another population (Razali and Wah, 2011). Regression and correlation tests include the
Ryan-Joiner, Shapiro-Francia and Shapiro-Wilk tests; however, this study will only discuss
the Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro and Wilk, 1965). Additionally, moment tests are described by
Seier (2002) as tests that are derived from the acknowledgement that the non-normality may
20
be detected based on the third and fourth sample moments, i.e. skewness and kurtosis. The
most commonly known moment tests in statistical literature are the D’Agostino-Pearson and
Jarque-Bera tests (D’Agostino and Pearson, 1973; Jarque and Bera, 1987).
The existing literature (D’Agostino and Pearson, 1973; D’Agostino and Stephens, 1986;
D’Agostino et al., 1990) presents a comprehensive explanation, and investigates the power
of goodness-of-fit tests, including the KS test, DP test, and LF test (Kolmogorov, 1933;
Lilliefors, 1967; D’Agostino and Pearson, 1973). D’Agostino et al. (1990) proposes the
D’Agostino-Pearson test as a powerful and informative normality test due to the K2 omnibus
test statistic of normality. “Omnibus” means that the test is able to detect departures from
normality due to either skewness or kurtosis.
The Anderson-Darling test is considered to one of the most powerful EDF tests, and its
performance is comparable with the Shapiro-Wilk test (Arshad et al., 2003; Razali and Wah,
2011). The literature (ibid.) further states that the Lilliefors test consistently outperforms the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test; however, it is less powerful than the SW and JB tests. Furthermore,
Steinskog et al. (2007) warns against the use of the KS test as a goodness-of-fit test due to
its relatively low power as its p-values exhibit a strong upward bias. This is consistent with
the findings of Baghban et al. (2013), where the literature the recommends the LF test in
lieu of the KS test.
Thadewald and Büning (2007) conclude that the Cramer Von Mises and Kolmogorov-Smirnov
tests are highly conservative in approximating the distribution parameters. The study (ibid.)
also finds that the Jarque-Bera test behaves very well for symmetric distributions with
medium-to-long tails and slightly skewed distributions with long tails. In a comparative study
using Monte-Carlo procedures on 50,000 simulated samples, Yap and Sim (2011) finds that the
Shapiro-Wilk test possesses strong power over a large range of asymmetric distributions, then
followed by the Anderson-Darling test. Furthermore, literature concludes that the SW and
DP tests are powerful tests for symmetric short-tailed distributions. The Anderson-Darling,
Jarque-Bera and Shapiro-Wilk tests work well with a symmetric long-tailed distribution. This
findings of the abovementioned studies are consistent with the results of Mendes and Pala
(2003), Keskin (2006), Romao et al. (2010), and Razali and Wah (2011) that the Shapiro-Wilk
test is the most powerful normality test.
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Given the abovementioned critique of the statistical literature, this dissertation will use the
following tests in the empirical analysis: Anderson-Darling, D’Agostino-Pearson, Jarque-
Bera, Lilliefors, and Shapiro-Wilk tests. These tests will be used to support the graphical
methods (histograms and QQ plots). Furthermore, the methodology behind these tests will
be explained in Chapter 4.
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3 Data and Sample Selection
The data presented in the following section will be used in the ensuing analysis. This section
will further explain the methods used to make adjustments to the data in order to remove
any irrelevant information and perform the relevant econometric analysis. Moreover, the data
was collected and formatted correctly in Microsoft Excel, such that it could be imported into
the relevant econometrics program. R (Version 3.5.2) statistical software was used to perform
the statistical inference and generate the necessary output.
3.1 Data
Two datasets are used to conduct the analysis. The first of these is the time series of closing
prices of the 100 largest equities listed on JSE as of 31 December 2015. The second of these
is the 100 shares that comprise of the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) industry and
sector indices that constitute the FTSE/JSE Africa All Share Index as of 31 December 2015.
For both datasets, the shares were ranked by marked capitalisation; notwithstanding that the
second dataset will be used in analysing the effect of blue letter days on the original data. It






where t ≥ 1 (9)
The abovementioned data was obtained from the JSE Limited in Johannesburg, and the
Bloomberg application program interface (API), which is extracted from the terminal at
Chancellor Oppenheimer Library at the University of Cape Town. The latter was exported
from the Bloomberg add-in on Microsoft Excel after which the return data was imported to
R. Bloomberg was chosen as a data source due to its broad coverage and availability of data
in non-US equity markets. Ince and Porter (2006) argues that individual equity return data
collected using Thomson Datastream for non-US markets demands serious care as a result of
potential drawbacks in the data.
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Table 2: Analysis of Sample Selection
Stocks
Original sample considered 100
Acquired and delisted equities (5)
Excluded for liquidity concerns (25)
General sample 70
No value in period under analysis (1)
Inaccessible equities (7)
Excluded on the basis of significant ADR exposure (6)
Sample used in econometric analysis 56
3.1.1 Return Interval
As previously stated in Section 3.1, the time series of closing prices of the equities was
extracted and exported for the analysis. For as long as the data is available for the time
series, equity returns can be computed over any time or investment horizon. As such, they
can be calculated over daily, weekly, monthly or yearly periods. Levy (1972) argued that a
quantitative study that is based on annual rates of return data will provide different results
from a study using monthly rates of return data. Furthermore, Prakash et al. (1997) found
that the investment horizon selected affects the approximated value of the moments of the
return distribution in question.
Berry et al. (1990) argues that using daily return data raises methodological issues as it may
yield results that model short-term phenomena or a spurious correlation. However, daily
intervals increase statistical power of the study through higher degrees of freedom. Addition-
ally, daily return data plays an instrumental role in modelling daily trends on reactions to
“specific events days” (ibid.). Consequently, a daily return interval is used in the forthcoming
analysis as it is utilised in the most of the relevant international literature. Ideally, this will
allow the empirical results to be more comparable between the related literature.
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3.1.2 Equity Sample Period
Part of the aim of creating relevant and accurate financial research is to source the data from
a period that is long enough to provide coherent results. Although practitioners question the
limitation of short sampling periods, it must be noted that longer sampling periods may lead
to time-varying findings. In case of the JSE, this is of paramount importance as the historical
dominance of resource equities has diminished with the rapid growth of the South African
market; thus, it has led to non-resource equities assuming a larger stake of the exchange
that they did before (Van Rensburg, 2002). Consequently, this could imply that conclusions
reached using longer sampling periods may depict realities that are instantaneous to the
sample period instead of demonstrating consistent phenomena.
The sample period of this study starts from 1 January 2016 until 31 December 2017 using
a 65-day rolling basis. The rolling day basis was chosen with the intent of increasing the
number of data points in the sample, and ensuring that any lagged macroeconomic data (for
example, Statistics South Africa sectoral reports) was considered in the data analysis. Since
daily returns are being investigated, the sample period provides power to the econometric
analysis done in the following chapter as there are enough data points to deliver meaningful
results. Furthermore, this period chosen offers insight into the behaviour of South African
equities after the 2008 Great Recession.
3.1.3 Equity Sample Selection
Initially, the 100 largest equities on the JSE Main Board were considered for inclusion in the
sample as shown in Appendix A.1 and Table 2. The stocks selected to conduct the relevant
analysis are current or former constituents of the FTSE/JSE Africa All Share Index. This
provided the best representation of liquid stocks on the JSE; however, five equities which were
delisted or acquired during the period under consideration were therefore excluded. Namely,
the Pick’n Pay Holdings stock was removed from the sample as it had been delisted from
the JSE on 14 June 2016 due to an unbundling. Beverage producer, Distell, also delisted
from the JSE in October 2017 due to the restructuring of its ownership structure. This
leaves 95 stocks remaining in the sample. Due to liquidity concerns, companies with market
capitalisations less than 10 billion Rand (ZAR) as of 1 January 2016 were excluded from the
sample. As such, companies including ADvTECH and Astral Foods were removed, and the
sample was reduced to 70 equities. This method is broadly similar to the approach used by
Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003); however, the literature used average monthly trading
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volume to filter the stocks as the authors were concerned with thin trading. Additionally, not
all of the equities are useful for the analysis or some equities are accessible to a small group
of investors. For this reason, eight stocks were removed including NewGold Issuer and Vukile
Property Fund; thus, leaving 62 equities remaining in the sample.
Some of the remaining stocks including Investec Limited have a significant presence on other
international exchanges through their dual listings. Other remaining JSE-listed stocks includ-
ing Woolworths Holdings have ADR listings in the United States. As such, the stocks need
to be evaluated for their ADR listings. Patro (2000) defines ADRs as “negotiable certificates
representing shares of a foreign corporation”. Since they are regarded as a conventional secu-
rity that is accessible to US investors, this implies that equities with significant ADR listings
are exposed to material systematic risk with their domestic and foreign markets. ADRs often
allow firms operating in emerging markets to escape detrimental domestic politico-economic
factors. This results in firms obtaining higher valuations and improved liquidity in US markets
(Karolyi, 2004).
For the purposes of finding single-listed JSE stocks, these stocks need to be removed from
the sample; however, a decision rule will be implemented. In other words, if the average
trading daily volume of the JSE-listed stock’s ADR is less than 25% of the actual stock’s
average trading daily volume, the stock in question will be included in the sample; otherwise,
it will be removed. The ADR volume and average daily volume of the equities were sourced
from Bloomberg. The rationale behind the decision rule was that since ADRs imply that the
remaining 62 equities are trading in the US financial markets, a significant ADR holding
would impede the efforts of this study to analyse single-listed JSE stocks. After implementing
the decision rule, six equities including AngloGold Ashanti and Woolworths Holdings were
excluded from the sample and this leaves 56 stocks to be used in the econometric analysis for
this study shown in Appendix A.2. Each equity will carry 567 data points and this sample
size provides the necessary robustness required to perform the statistical goodness-of-fit tests
in the next chapter.
3.1.4 Index Sample Selection
Theoretically, indices serve as benchmarks for the market-at-large. They aggregate and
categorise stocks on the basis of some criteria. In the context of this study, they will help to
identify sector leaders and analyse the effect of blue letter days on each industry and equity.
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Furthermore, when classifying the 56 stocks in the sample according to the indices, this study
uses 20 JSE indices.
Bloomberg provides information on the constituents and member weightings of the JSE
indices; however, viewing the constituents of some indices, including General Industrials
(JSE Index Code J272) require permission from the JSE. It must be highlighted that the
leading constituent of an index might not be included in the equity sample. Therefore, for
the purposes of this study, the sector leader will be determined by the stock with the largest
market capitalisation among the equities used in Appendix A.3.
3.1.5 Removal of Red and Blue Letter Days
As previously discussed in Section 2.4, days with predetermined information releases will be
regarded as (i) red letter days, and (ii) blue letter days. For red letter days, the release dates
of the Monetary Policy Statements from January 2016 are sourced from the South African
Reserve Bank website. Equivalently, the release dates of the US nonfarm payrolls are obtained
from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. After the dates are collected, the corresponding
returns for each equity in the sample were removed from the dataset on Microsoft Excel. This
amounts to 42 red letter days and leaves 525 observations for each stock in the sample. The
adjusted data was imported to R and the relevant analysis will be conducted as discussed in
the next chapter.
For the purposes of this study, blue letter days will refer to industry and firm-specific news:
(i) interim earnings announcements, (ii) final earnings announcements, (iii) the release of
quarterly company trading reports and (iv) Statistics South Africa sectoral reports. The
publication dates of interim and final earnings announcements for each equity were extracted
from Bloomberg ; however, SENS can release earnings announcements after the close of the JSE.
This also means that the effect of those announcements may be realised on the next business
day in South Africa. As such, the time and dates of the blue letter days is instrumental in
determining the removal of these micro-outliers.
Moreover, the release of company trading reports will be included in this study. Most firms
issue these voluntary reports on a quarterly basis in accordance with JSE Listing Require-
ments (Johannesburg Stock Exchange., 2011). According to Regulation 43(1)(e)(iii) relating
to banks, all banking institutions are required to compile and release quarterly disclosures
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relating to Pillar 3 of Basel rules. This means that banks are required to disclose qualitative
information regarding their capital adequacy and liquidity ratios on a quarterly basis (South
African Reserve Bank, 2012). Similar to the earnings announcements, the time and dates of
these trading reports are provided by SENS and are extracted from Bloomberg.
Additionally, Statistics South Africa releases monthly production and/or sales publications on
various sectors of the economy, including manufacturing and mining. The Mining: Production
and Sales (Statistics South Africa Publication Code P2041) and Retail Trade Sales (Statistics
South Africa Publication Code P6242.1) report dates will be used in this dissertation. Future
publication dates are made available to the general public on the Statistics South Africa
website. Furthermore, the abovementioned statistical releases are published at 11:30 CAT
for mining, and at 13:00 CAT for retail (Statistics South Africa, n.d.). As such, there are
27 blue letter days respectively. In accordance with the Statistics South Africa definition
of “retail”, the retail blue letter days will affect the constituents of the following indices: (i)
Food and Drug Retailers (JSE Index Code J533), and (ii) General Retailers (JSE Index Code
J537). Equivalently, the mining blue letter days will affect the constituents of the Mining
Index (JSE Index Code J177) (Johannesburg Stock Exchange, n.d.).
The returns corresponding to the blue letter days were removed on Microsoft Excel. This
results in the remaining observations decreasing from 525 to varying between 485 and 522 in
the sample. The augmented data is imported again to R for the analysis to be conducted.
3.2 Potential Biases and Adjustments
3.2.1 Survivorship Bias
Survivorship bias in empirical research occurs when variables (equities in this case) which
have failed to survive are removed from the sample (Haugen and Baker, 1996). In financial
research, this implies that delisted and/or inactive stocks are excluded. Ferreira and Krige
(2011) argues that this results in successful companies being left in the sample; thus, the
returns can exhibit upward bias in a performance analysis. Furthermore, this may not affect
the outcome of the research materially, but Gilbert and Strugnell (2010) suggests that includ-
ing data on delisted securities will probably have a considerable impact on the results obtained.
Survivorship bias is regarded as the most frequent cause of inaccurate conclusions deduced in
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financial analysis. However, this dissertation is analysing the historical price series of each
equity and building the return series individually. There is little propensity for survivorship
bias. Furthermore, the stocks were excluded from the sample on account of (i) acquisitions,
(ii) delistings, (iii) illiquidity, (iv) inaccessibility to general investors, and (v) high ADR
exposure. Additionally, only five equities were removed due to (i) and (ii) over the entire
period in question; notwithstanding that the use of daily equity returns implies that having a
complete series of observations is paramount for the empirical analysis in Chapter 5. Lastly,
survivorship bias would be a material concern if this dissertation were investigating equity
indices or pursuing a portfolio approach in the data analysis.
3.2.2 Data Snooping
Data snooping occurs when a study is conducted within a specific database, and the output
is tested within the sample of the very database (Haugen and Baker, 1996). The bias may
misrepresent the results due to the intrinsic nature of the data in lieu of fundamental reason-
ing. Although data snooping may reveal itself in this dissertation, the literature (Lo, 1994;
Haugen and Baker, 1996) proposes conducting out-of-sample tests to generate the robustness
and validity of empirical results. Sullivan et al. (1999) proposes the Whites Reality Check
as a common adjustment tool in academia, and it is recommended for future research in
ameliorating the robustness of results affected by data snooping. Due to the complexity of
out-of-sample tests, they will not be included in the study; however, this project follows the
methodological approaches from the existing literature.
3.2.3 Dividend Considerations
Equity prices are generally known to decline on the ex-dividend date, when the equity no
longer trades with the right to the next dividend pay-out (Koski and Scruggs, 1998). This
implies that a price return series may demonstrate an inaccurate reflection of investor returns,
which Toerien et al. (2014) argues to be relevant for the JSE as it is a market with a high
dividend yield. As such, ignoring dividends in the calculation of a price return series may
lead to spurious outliers. It must be acknowledged that while some outliers may have the
possibility of being linked to ex-dividend events, days of unplanned information releases in
emerging markets like South Africa can play a major role in the existence of those outlying
return values. Furthermore, share returns will not be adjusted for ex-dividend dates in this
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study; however, additional care will be exercised in analysing the remaining observations in
the variables, and any outlying values will be checked with their corresponding dates to see
whether they coincide with dividend announcements.
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4 Methodology
This chapter presents the methods used to analyse the data as previously discussed in Section
2.5. R (R Core Team, 2018) is used to reach the results as discussed in the next section. The
programming is performed in RStudio (Version 1.1.463) as it is a mature platform for data
analysis. Furthermore, there is a wide variety of statistical packages available in R.
The first part of the analysis was conducted by running graphical tests for normality or
deviations from normality. It must be emphasised that most analysts tend to deduce that a
dataset follows a Gaussian or non-normal distribution graphically via normal quantile-quantile
(QQ) plots and/or histograms; however, these methods fail to supply objective and conclusive
proof regarding the distribution of the data. But Chambers et al. (1983) highlights that
graphical methods provide a general hint about the cause of the rejection of the normality
hypothesis. As such, numerical methods and statistical inference procedures are implemented
to support the graphical methods. All of the histograms and QQ plots displayed as part of
the empirical results are generated in R.
The second part of the analysis incorporates goodness-of-fit tests in order to detect any
departures from normality. For the sake of consistency, the methodology is divided into four
sections: (i) graphical methods in Section 4.1, (ii) EDF tests in Section 4.2, (iii) regression
and correlation tests in Section 4.3, and (iv) moment tests in Section 4.4.
4.1 Graphical Methods
4.1.1 Histogram
As previously discussed, the histogram is one of the most commonly graphical methods used
for normality assumption checking. The histogram plots the frequency distribution or density
curve of observed values and visually demonstrates whether the distribution resembles a
bell-shaped curve curve or not. It also provides insights into outliers and gaps in the data.
Furthermore, it shows the level of skewness or asymmetry in the data (Keeping, 1962; Das
and Imon, 2016). This study used density histograms.
Figure 1 demonstrates that the data resembles a bell-shaped curve; thus it is said to be
normally-distributed. As such, the second graph represents the data where it is not normally
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distributed as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 1: Histogram demonstrates that the data is normally distributed (Freeman, n.d.).
Figure 2: Histogram demonstrates that the data is not normally distributed (University of
Florida Health, n.d.).
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4.1.2 Normal Quantile-Quantile Plot
Das and Imon (2016) describe a QQ plot as a graphical representation that compares the
“quantiles of the empirical data distribution with the quantiles of a standardised theoretical
distribution from a special family of distributions”. Therefore, a normal QQ plot compares
the quantiles of one distribution against quantiles of the Gaussian distribution.
The literature (ibid.) states that when the quantiles of two distributions are met, the plotting
dots face with the line y = x. If the normal QQ plot demonstrates the curve size is increasing
from left to right and curve size diminishing from left to right, it reveals that the distribution
of the data is skewed to the left (negative-skewed distribution). Normal QQ plots presented
below in Figures 3 and 4 are taken from Bogart and Robbins (2019). The first graph demon-
strates a normality pattern while the second plot shows non-normality and the presence of
outliers.
Figure 3: Normal Quantile-Quantile Plot demonstrates that the data is normally distributed.
33
Figure 4: Normal Quantile-Quantile Plot demonstrates that the data is not normally dis-
tributed.
4.2 Empirical Distribution Function Tests
4.2.1 Anderson-Darling Test
As an adaptation of the Cramer-von Mises test (CVM) (Smirnov, 1936; Von Mises, 1932;
Cramér, 1928), the Anderson-Darling test (AD) (Anderson and Darling, 1954) is an exam-
ple of an empirical distribution function (EDF) test, which compares the distribution of
the dataset to the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a Gaussian distribution and
ascertains the goodness-of-fit between the two. Yap and Sim (2011) states that the AD
test assigns more weight to the tail distribution relative to CVM test; however, the latter is
a non-parametric test whereas the former employs the exact postulated distribution when
computing its critical values. Consequently, AD test is relatively more sensitive than the
CVM test; notwithstanding that a disadvantage of the former is that those critical values
have to be computed for every specific distribution.
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by Ψ[F (x)]. It is worth noting that when Ψ[F (x)] is equal to one, the AD statistic reduces








If X(1) ≤ X(2) ≤ ... ≤ X(n) refers to the ordered observations in a sample size n, then the AD
statistic is calculated as
AD = −




where Pi represents the CDF of the particular distribution. To test for Gaussianity, set
Pi = Φ(Y(i)) where Y(i) =
(X(i) − X̄)
S
, as the standardised variable and X̄ and S is the sample
mean and deviation, respectively.
4.2.2 Lilliefors Test
As a correction of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the Lilliefors test is appropriate when the
parameters need to be approximated based on the sample data whereas the KS test requires
the parameters of the hypothesised distribution to be known (Lilliefors, 1967) . The LF
test is also less conservative than the KS test; thus, for a sample of n observations, the LF
statistic is defined as (ibid.),
D = maxx[F ∗ (X)– − Sn(X)] (14)
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where F ∗ (X) refers to the cumulative normal distribution function with the sample mean,
µ = X̄, and Sn(X) is the sample CDF, and the sample variance, s
2, is defined with the
denominator n− 1 (Razali and Wah, 2011).
Although the KS and LF statistics are the same, the table for the latter’s critical values is
different which yields different findings regarding the normality of a dataset (Mendes and Pala,
2003). The table of critical values for the Lilliefors test can be found in a statistics textbook
authored by Conover (1999). It is important to note that if the LF statistic is greater than
the corresponding critical value in the aforementioned table, then the null hypothesis of
normality is rejected at the relevant significance level (Lilliefors, 1967).
4.3 Regression and Correlation Tests
4.3.1 Shapiro-Wilk Test
The Shapiro -Wilk test was initially restricted to a sample size of n ≤ 50. This spurred on
the creation of SW test variations which include revisions by Shapiro and Francia (1972) and
Rahman and Govindarajulu (1997). If an ordered arbitrary sample size n follow a Gaussian
distribution such that X(1) ≤ X(2) ≤ ... ≤ X(n), then let m′ = (m1,m2, ....,mn) refer to the
vector of expected values of the Gaussian order statistics. Therefore, V = (vij) denotes
the n x n covariance matrix of these order statistics. Moreover, let Y ′ = (Y(1), Y(2), ...., Y(n)
represent the vector of arranged arbitrary observations from a random population; thus, if
Y(i)’s are ordered observations from a Gaussian distribution with unknown parameters, then
Y(i) = µ+ σX(i) (i = 1, 2, ..., n) (Yap and Sim, 2011). As such, the literature (ibid.) defines






i=1(Yi − Ȳ )2
] , (15)
where
a′ = m′V −1(m′V −1m)1/2 (16)
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and
0 ≤ SW ≤ 1 (17)
.
Furthermore, a(i) refers to the weights derived from (Shapiro and Wilk, 1965) for the original
sample size. Also, when the test statistic equals one, it implies that the data follows a
Gaussian distribution. Conversely, small values of the SW test statistic result in the rejection
of normality. Royston (1982a,b,c, 1992) modified the SW test to widen the sample size
restriction to 2000 through providing the algorithm AS181. Furthermore, Royston (1995)
released algorithm AS R94 which can be utilised for any n in the range 3 ≤ n ≤ 5000. This
dissertation used the algorithm AS R94.
4.4 Moment Tests
4.4.1 Jarque-Bera Test
Jarque and Bera (1987) asserts that the Jarque-Bera test (JB) possesses optimum asymptotic
power characteristics and satisfactory countable sample performance. This test is derived
from the use of the Lagrangian multiplier procedure on the Pearson system of distributions
to acquire tests for Gaussianity of normality of findings and linear regression residuals (Yap
and Sim, 2011). Bowman and Shenton (1975) suggests the JB statistic as a test statistic;
notwithstanding that the JB statistic converges to a Pearson’s chi-squared distribution with














As such, the JB statistic is negligible for a symmetric Gaussian distribution; thus, high values
of skewness and kurtosis exceeding three result in the null hypothesis of normality being
rejected (McDonald, 1996; Stuart and Ord, 1987).
4.4.2 D’Agostino-Pearson Test
D’Agostino and Pearson (1973) observed that the sample skewness (
√
b1) and kurtosis (b2)
are utililsed separately in skewness and kurtosis tests to determine whether random samples
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are taken from a normal population. The literature (ibid.) proposed the K2 test statistic to







b1) and Z(b2) are the normal approximations to the abovementioned sample skew-
ness and kurtosis, respectively (D’Agostino and Stephens, 1986). As previously mentioned in
Section 2.5, the K2 statistic is an omnibus test of normality and follows a chi-squared distri-
bution with two degrees of freedom when the population is normally distributed. Large values
of the test statistic results in the rejection of the null hypothesis of normality (D’Agostino




This chapter will evaluate the results from the analysis conducted using the methodology
explained in Chapter 4. The first part of the results is discussing the normality tests results
of the original data. Appendices C to E detail the graphical and statistical output of the
equities, and Appendix B includes the descriptive statistics. The results from the original
data will be used as groundwork for the results after the macro-outliers and micro-outliers are
removed, respectively. The quantitative results arrived at follow a relatively similar approach
to Peiro (1999), Prakash et al. (2003) and Chión et al. (2008) which utilise the normality
tests discussed in Chapter 4 to detect non-normality in stock returns. The second and third
sections include results (i) after the removal of red letter days, and (ii) red and blue letter
days, respectively. Moreover, the third section discusses the results in terms of the sectoral
indices as classified by the JSE as shown in Appendix A.3.
5.1 Return Behaviour of the Original Data
Appendix B.1 presents the summary statistics of the original data for the daily equities
returns. Approximately 70% of the stocks in the sample have positive mean returns for daily
data. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of five equities from the sample. These stocks
cover different industries, including banks, and general retailers. For the sake of consistency,
these stocks will also be used in the Sections 5.2 and 5.3 for explanatory purposes. Kumba
Iron Ore Limited had the highest mean return (0.003380) in the entire sample and EOH
Holdings had the lowest mean return (-0.001929); thus, the effective range was 0.005309.
When evaluating the standard deviation, Kumba Iron Ore Limited demonstrated the highest
volatility (0.042567) and the Vodacom Group showed the lowest volatility (0.012526).
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Five Stocks from the Original Data




-0.001929 0.033293 -3.846743 52.079504 0.001398
Kumba Iron
Ore
0.003380 0.042567 0.534197 5.417860 0.001788
Nedbank
Group
0.000731 0.018093 0.006468 0.862577 0.000760
Truworths In-
ternational
0.000164 0.022859 0.045534 1.034871 0.000960
Vodacom
Group
-0.000045 0.012526 -0.135078 4.218090 0.000526
In the abovementioned appendix, the values of skewness and kurtosis for every equity are
shown. Skewness and kurtosis denotes the third and fourth standardised moments, respec-
tively. Additionally, it must be highlighted that any moments exceeding the third cannot
be justified and are to be ignored (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1976; Prakash and Bear, 1986;
Prakash et al., 2003). Although the entire sample exhibited skewness, positive skewness was
especially dominant in this study. 57% of the equities demonstrated positive skewness. This
therefore implies that deviations from the mean will be positive, and the distribution of the
daily returns is asymmetrical with a positive skew.
Statistical tests were carried out on with the aim of assessing the distribution of the stocks be-
fore the relevant outliers were removed. The histograms in Appendix C show the approximate
probability distribution of the data, which is relatively normal; however, upon superimposing
a normal density curve on each histogram, it becomes apparent that the majority of the stocks
exhibit a high degree of skewness. As a continuation of the visual evaluation of normality, the
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normal Q-Q plots aim to benchmark the empirical results to that of a normal distribution.
(a) Histogram
(b) QQ plot
Figure 5: Histogram and Normal Quantile-Quantile Plot of Truworths International
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Truworths International strongly resembles the Gaussian distribution accompanied by a
positive mean, and slight skewness and kurtosis. This is confirmed by the density histogram.
Furthermore, the normal QQ plot shows that the majority of the data points lie on the line,
which adds credibility to the suggestion that Truworths International is normally distributed.





Figure 6: Histogram and Normal Quantile-Quantile Plot of EOH Holdings
As seen in Figure 6, EOH Holdings demonstrates negative skewness. However, it must be
noted that EOH Holdings has a negative mean which (with the negative skewness) means that
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the overall performance of the stock is negative; thus, the outliers are most likely negative.
The normal Q-Q plot further reveals that the data is overdispersed relative to that of a
normal distribution, as demonstrated by the reverse S-shape. This is often accompanied by
an increased number of outliers in the sample. The normal QQ plot confirms this and demon-
strates a presence of large negative outliers in EOH Holdings. Although the abovementioned
tools provide insight into the behaviour of the data, statistical goodness-of-fit tests are more
reliable and objective as previously discussed in Chapter 4.
Table 4: Goodness-of-fit test results of the five stocks from the original data
Normality Test Statistics
AD LF SW JB DP
EOH Hold-
ings
26.772*** 0.13772*** 0.71212*** 64320*** -18.3010***
Kumba Iron
Ore
4.2981*** 0.069048*** 0.95104*** 705.47*** 4.94100***
Nedbank
Group
0.84146** 0.031314 0.99301*** 16.85*** 0.0635110
Truworths In-
ternational
0.96859** 0.031371 0.99106*** 24.544*** 0.446910
Vodacom
Group




In the Anderson-Darling test, all of the equities have returns that are statistically significant
across two significance levels (α = 0.10, and α = 0.05), which is indicative of departures from
normality. However, at a one percent significance level, Table 4 shows that the Nedbank
Group and Truworths International stocks fail to reject the null hypothesis of the Gaussian
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distribution. Moreover, for the Lilliefors test, the test fails to detect deviations from normality
for two stocks at a 90% confidence level (α = 0.10): the Nedbank Group and Truworths
International. It is worth noting that these stocks fail to reject normality for both EDF
tests in this study. Nonetheless, majority of the sample rejects the null hypothesis at a five
percent significance level (α = 0.05). However, when the significance level is lowered to one
percent, the RMB Holdings and AVI Limited stocks also fail to reject the null hypothesis of
normality. Across both EDF tests, at least 50 stocks reject normality at a 99% confidence level.
In the Shapiro-Wilk test, majority of the stocks produced W test statistics that were greater
than or equal to 0.90, which is indicative of convergence to normality as some of the test statis-
tics are approaching 1. An exception to this observation was EOH Holdings (as seen in Table
4) which had a test statistic of 0.7212. Nonetheless, the entire sample of 56 equities rejects the
null hypothesis of normality across three significance levels (α = 0.10, α = 0.05, and α = 0.01).
Similar to the previous results, the Jarque-Bera test yields strong evidence in favour of
rejecting the null hypothesis at a ten percent significance level and five percent significance
level across all stocks. However, at a 99% confidence level, the Pick ‘n Pay Stores equity
is the only stock that fails to reject the null hypothesis. As such, it can be said that the
Jarque-Bera test detects departures from normality at a one percent significance level for
the remaining 55 stocks in the sample. For the D’Agostino-Pearson test, the test fails to
reject the null hypothesis of normality at a 90% confidence level for 20 stocks. The stocks
include the Nedbank Group, Truworths International, and the Vodacom Group. This means
that, at a ten percent significance level (α = 0.10), the test fails to detect deviations from
normality through the sample moments, namely: skewness and kurtosis. Moreover, the DP
test fails to reject the normality at a 95% confidence level for five more stocks, including
Sanlam and Reunert. When the significance level is lowered to one percent, the DP test fails
to reject the null hypothesis for five more stocks, including Remgro and Hosken Consolidated
Investments. Although some of the stocks strongly exhibit departures from normality, it is
apparent that the Nedbank Group and Truworths International stocks are arguably close to
a normal distribution with minimal skewness and kurtosis.
Some of the goodness-of-fit tests yielded results where the entire sample strongly rejected
the null hypothesis of normality. This could be attributed to the sensitivity of the above
tests to outliers in the sample. Nonetheless, the graphical and statistical methods show that,
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before the removal of macro-outliers and micro-outliers, the distribution of daily equity re-
turns is asymmetrical and mainly positively-skewed which may impact the distribution of risk.
5.2 Return Behaviour after the removal of Red Letter Days
Appendix B.2 presents the summary statistics of the data for the daily equities returns
after the removal of red letter days. From an initial inspection, the abovementioned de-
scriptive statistics show that the stocks are still skewed and thick-tailed, including Kumba
Iron Ore as shown in Figure 7. Figure 9 demonstrates the near-perfect symmetry of the
Truworths International’s daily return distribution after the initial removal of red letter days;
notwithstanding its mean daily returns have dropped by more than 40%. However, outliers
remain persistent in the data as confirmed by Figures 8 and 10.
(a) (b)
Figure 7: Histograms of Kumba Iron Ore (a) using the original data, and (b) after the removal
of red letter days
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(a) (b)
Figure 8: Normal Quantile-Quantile Plots of Kumba Iron Ore (a) using the original data,
and (b) after the removal of red letter days
(a) (b)
Figure 9: Histograms of Truworths International (a) using the original data, and (b) after
the removal of red letter days
47
(a) (b)
Figure 10: Normal Quantile-Quantile Plots of Truworths International (a) using the original
data, and (b) after the removal of red letter days
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of the Five Stocks from the Data after the Removal
of Red Letter Days
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-0.001975 0.033962 -3.901860 51.857344 0.001482
Kumba Iron
Ore
0.003537 0.043066 0.541045 5.523215 0.001880
Nedbank
Group
0.000590 0.018008 -0.043331 0.969872 0.000786
Truworths In-
ternational
0.000097 0.023066 0.043729 1.089774 0.001007
Vodacom
Group
-0.000075 0.012593 -0.184124 4.452341 0.000550
Approximately 68% of the stocks in the sample demonstrate positive mean returns for the
daily data. Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of five equities after the red letter days
were removed. Kumba Iron Ore Limited again had the highest mean return (0.003537)
and EOH Holdings had the lowest mean return (-0.001975); thus, the effective range was
0.005512. The effective range increased by more than 60%. The increase in the range may
be linked to the fact that 34 out of the 56 equities in the sample reported a decrease in
the mean daily returns after the removal of red letter days. Furthermore, Figure 11 below
demonstrates that there is a large negative outlier in EOH Holdings. Tongaat Hulett re-
ported a decrease of approximately 179% in the mean daily returns after the macro-outliers
were omitted from the data. When evaluating the standard deviation, Kumba Iron Ore
Limited also demonstrated the highest volatility (0.043066) and the Vodacom Group showed
the lowest volatility (0.012593). It is interesting to note that approximately 54% of the
sample demonstrated an increase in the standard deviation after the removal of macro-outliers.
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(a) (b)
Figure 11: Normal Quantile-Quantile Plots of EOH Holdings (a) using the original data, and
(b) after the removal of red letter days
Following the results of the original data, the adjusted sample demonstrated skewness. Posi-
tive skewness dominated 55% of the sample; thus implying that deviations from the mean will
be positive, and the distribution of the daily returns after the removal of red letter days is
asymmetrical and positively-skewed. Nonetheless, the removal of red letter days does appear
to have a “smoothing” effect on the distribution of the stocks at a visual level . However,
outliers are still present in the data as confirmed by the histograms and QQ plots in Figures
7 to 11, and Appendix D altogether.
In the Anderson-Darling test, the whole sample rejects the null hypothesis across two sig-
nificance levels (α = 0.10 and α = 0.05). However, when the significance level is lowered
to one percent, Table 6 shows two equities failing to reject the null hypothesis: Nedbank
Group Limited and Truworths International. As such, this means that the remaining 54
stocks have returns that are statistically significant at a 99% confidence level and reject
normality. Furthermore, in the Lillefors test, the Truworths International stock fail to reject
the null hypothesis at a ten percent significance level. When the confidence level is increased
to 95%, two more stocks (including the Nedbank Group) fail to reject normality. It is worth
noting that the Nedbank Group and Truworths International stocks failed to reject the null
hypothesis for both EDF tests at a 95% confidence level. Coincidentally, this is consistent
with the results of the original data. Additionally, when the significance level is lowered to
one percent, the Lilliefors test fails to reject normality for three more stocks: the Pioneer
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Foods Group, RMB Holdings, and RMI Holdings. This also means that approximately 90%
of the sample is statistically significant at a one percent level; thus, it rejects normality.
Moreover, it is apparent that both EDF tests detect departures from normality for at least
50 stocks in the sample, which corresponds with the results from the original data.
Table 6: Goodness-of-fit test results of the five stocks from the data after remov-
ing red letter days
Normality Test Statistics
AD LF SW JB DP
EOH Hold-
ings
25.508*** 0.13923*** 0.70424*** 59013*** -17.7520***
Kumba Iron
Ore
4.0932*** 0.068137*** 0.94946*** 677.44*** 4.8135***
Nedbank
Group
1.0301** 0.037285* 0.99145*** 19.874*** -0.409570
Truworths In-
ternational
1.0064** 0.031136 0.99012*** 25.118*** 0.413320
Vodacom
Group




For the Shapiro-Wilk test, all 56 equities in the sample have returns that are statistically
significant across three significance levels (α = 0.10, α = 0.05, and α = 0.01) as seen in
Appendix D. Table 6 confirms the observation, which may imply that the sample observations
are poorly correlated with the associated normal scores (Das and Imon, 2016). Moreover,
these results are consistent with the findings in the previous section.
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Across three significance levels (α = 0.10, α = 0.05, and α = 0.01), the sample strongly
rejects the null hypothesis of normality for the Jarque-Bera test, respectively. This consistent
with the findings of the original data in Section 5.1. In the D’Agostino-Pearson test, 21
stocks failed to reject the null hypothesis at a 90% confidence level. These stocks included
Reunert and Sanlam, which is consistent with the results of the original data. Furthermore,
the Vodacom Group stock is the only additional equity that fails to reject normality at a five
significance level as seen in Table 6. However, when the confidence level is increased to 99%,
the DP test fails to detect non-normality through the sample moments in eleven more stocks,
including Remgro and Hosken Consolidated Investments. This therefore means that, at a
99% confidence level, 33 out of 56 stocks fail to reject the null hypothesis of normality. This
number grew from 30 equities, which could imply that the removal of red letter may have led
to less asymmetry and thinner tails.
While the D’Agostino-Pearson test may yield interesting results, it is important to highlight
that the other goodness-of-fit tests demonstrate that at least ± 90% of the sample has returns
that are statistically significant at a 99% confidence level after red letter days have been
removed from the dataset. This could be attributed to the presence of micro-outliers in
the sample; notwithstanding that it must be acknowledged that, despite the power of these
goodness-of-fit tests, they are very sensitive to outlying values. Also, for large samples, the
likelihood of the null hypothesis being rejected increases as the sample size increases.
5.3 Return Behaviour after the removal of Red and Blue Letter
Days
Appendix B.3 shows the descriptive statistics of the daily stock returns after the removal of
red and blue letter days. From initial observations, the summary statistics still demonstrate
a presence of skewness and excess kurtosis in the equities. Similar to the previous section,
Figures 12 and 13 represents Truworths International’s daily return distribution resembling
that of a perfect Gaussian distribution after the removal of blue letter days. Moreover,
it is interesting to note that Truworths International’s mean daily returns have fallen by





Figure 12: Histograms of Truworths International (a) using the original data, (b) after the





Figure 13: Normal Quantile-Quantile Plots of Truworths International (a) using the original
data, (b) after the removal of red letter days, and (c) after the removal of red and blue letter
days 54
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of the Five Stocks from the Data after the Removal
of Red and Blue Letter Days




-0.001832 0.033981 -3.928957 52.212005 0.001489
Kumba Iron
Ore
0.003263 0.041718 0.532439 6.174376 0.001844
Nedbank
Group
0.000545 0.017728 -0.090962 0.860605 0.000780
Truworths In-
ternational
-0.000083 0.022585 0.111664 0.907658 0.001023
Vodacom
Group
0.000044 0.012461 -0.160272 4.694274 0.000546
More than 66% of the equities in the sample show positive mean daily returns. Table 7 shows
that Kumba Iron Ore once again had the highest mean return (0.003263) which could be
attributed to the larger positive outlier as demonstrated by Figure 14. EOH Holdings had
the lowest mean return (-0.001832); thus, the effective range was 0.005095 which is less than
the effective range as reported in Section 5.2. However, the effective range after the removal
of red and blue days is significantly larger than of the original data. This could be linked to
the fact that 30 out of the 56 stocks included in the sample reported a fall in the mean daily





Figure 14: Normal Quantile-Quantile Plots of Kumba Iron Ore (a) using the original data,
(b) after the removal of red letter days, and (c) after the removal of red and blue letter days
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Upon scrutinising the standard deviation, Kumba Iron Ore once again showed the high-
est volatility (0.041718) and the Vodacom Group also demonstrated the lowest volatility
(0.012461). It is important to highlight that more than 82% of the sample reported a decrease
in the standard deviation after red and blue letter days were removed from the data. This
may imply that the removal of macro-outliers and micro-outliers from daily equity return
data leads results in decreased volatility.
The largest JSE indices used in this study include: Banks (JSE Index Code J835), Food and
Drug Retailers (JSE Index Code J533), Food Producers (JSE Index Code J537), General
Industrials (JSE Index Code J272), General Retailers (JSE Index Code J537), and Mining
(JSE Index Code J177). RMB Holdings was the only stock in the Banks Index that reported
a mean daily return (0.00097) beating that of the sector leader, FirstRand Limited (0.000869).
Despite representing the lowest mean daily return in the index, Absa Group demonstrated
the highest volatility (0.020602); thus exceeding that of FirstRand (0.019641).
In terms of mean daily returns, the Clicks Group (0.001534) and Pick ‘n Pay Stores stocks
(0.000105) beat the Food and Drug Retailers Index ’s leader, Shoprite Holdings (0.00001).
However, Shoprite Holdings reported the highest volatility (0.017484) in the index. Addition-
ally, in the Food Producers Index, AVI Limited (0.000949) is the only equity that outperformed
the sector leader, Tiger Brands Limited (0.0003), in terms of daily returns while the rest
reported negative figures. Pioneer Foods Group (0.019677) and the Oceana Group (0.000105)
stocks also demonstrated volatilities exceeding that of the Tiger Brands.
In the General Industrials Index, three stocks beat the sector leader, Remgro, in terms of mean
daily returns: Bidvest Group (0.001650), KAP Industrial Holdings (0.000063), and Barloworld
(0.0013). With respect to the standard deviation, all of the member stocks reported higher
volatilities than Remgro. Furthermore, as the sector leader of the General Retailers Index, Mr
Price Group (0.000860) retained the lead while Curro Holdings (-0.000231) reported negative
daily returns. Massmart Holdings, TFG and Truworths International exceeded the sector
leader, in terms of volatility.
Lastly, in the Mining Index, Exxaro Resources (0.0027) is the only stock in the index that
beat the leader, Anglo American Platinum (0.000611), with respect to mean daily returns. It
is worth noting that the index is more volatile relative to its counterparts. Impala Platinum
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(0.000105) and Exxaro Resources (0.031370) were more volatile than the sector leader.
The augmented sample exhibited skewness in the entire sample, especially positive skewness
dominated by approximately 61%. This therefore implies that the distribution of daily equity
returns, after the removal of macro-outliers and micro-outliers, continues to be asymmetrical
and positively-skewed. As such, deviations from the mean have a stronger likelihood of being
positive.
Table 8: Goodness-of-fit test results of the five stocks from the data after remov-
ing red and blue letter days
Normality Test Statistics
AD LF SW JB DP
EOH Hold-
ings
25.653*** 0.14097*** 0.70136*** 59358*** -17.7400***
Kumba Iron
Ore
3.6622*** 0.064371*** 0.94722*** 818.53*** 4.68740***
Nedbank
Group
0.84013** 0.036294 0.99269** 15.903*** -0.851240
Truworths In-
ternational
0.76449** 0.028376 0.99125*** 16.937*** 1.01480
Vodacom
Group




The Anderson-Darling test reveals that all 56 equities have returns that are statistically
significant across two significance levels (α = 0.10, and α = 0.05). However, at a one
percent significance level, Table 8 shows that three equities fail to reject the null hypothesis
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including the Nedbank Group and Truworths International. This means that the remaining
53 stocks in the sample have returns that are statistically significant at a 99% confidence
level and reject normality. Moreover, the Lilliefors test fails to reject three stocks, again
including the Nedbank Group and Truworths International, at a ten percent significance
level. This is consistent with previous findings for both EDF tests. Furthermore, at a 95%
confidence level, one more stock is statistically significant: RMB Holdings. However, when
the level of confidence increases to 99%, seven more stocks reject the null hypothesis. These
stocks include the Pioneer Foods Group, and RMI Holdings which corresponds with the
results from previous sections. This also means that 45 equities still reject the null hypothesis
of Gaussianity at a 99% confidence level after the removal of macro-outliers and micro-outliers.
Similar to the Anderson-Darling test, the Shapiro-Wilk test strongly rejects the null hypothe-
sis across two significance levels (α = 0.10, and α = 0.05) for the whole sample. At a one
percent significance level, however, the test reveals that the Nedbank Group and JSE Limited
stocks fail to reject the null hypothesis. This implies that 96% of the sample has returns that
are statistically significant at a 99% confidence level and exhibits departures from normality.
Moreover, these results are consistent with the previous sections.
For the Jarque-Bera test, the JSE Limited stock is the only equity in the sample that fails to
reject the null hypothesis at a 90% confidence level. The remaining 55 stocks strongly reject
the null hypothesis of Gaussianity across two significance levels (α = 0.10, and α = 0.05).
This consistent with the findings of the original data in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. Additionally,
the D’Agostino-Pearson test reveals that 22 stocks fail to reject the null hypothesis at 90%
confidence level. These stocks include JSE Limited, the Nedbank Group, Sanlam, and
Truworths International. Furthermore, when the confidence level is increased to 95%, two
more stocks fail to reject the null hypothesis. Likewise, at a one percent significance level,
eight more stocks fail to reject the null hypothesis. The stocks include Hosken Consolidated
Investments, Remgro, and Reunert. Moreover, the D’Agostino-Pearson test demonstrates
that approximately 59% of the sample fails to reject normality at a 99% confidence level.
Equivalently, the test detected deviations from normality via the sample moments in 24
equities; notwithstanding these results are in line with the previous sections. This could mean
that the omission of macro-outliers and micro-outliers from the data results in increased
symmetry, and lower kurtosis.
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Similar to the previous sections, the goodness-of-fit tests (except the D’Agostino-Pearson)
highlight that at least 80% of the sample rejects the null hypothesis of normality after the
removal of red and blue letter days at a 99% confidence level. As previously explained,
this could be attributed to the presence of outliers in the data. The outlying values could
represent unforeseen events of increased market and/or sectoral volatility.
5.4 Discussion of Results
The above empirical results demonstrate a trend that is consistent with the related inter-
national literature (Kon, 1984; Brown and Warner, 1985; Berry et al., 1990; Peiro, 1999).
South African daily return data for single-listed equities is primarily positively-skewed and
thick-tailed. For some stocks, the omission of a priori macro-outliers and micro-outliers
from the dataset has resulted in closer fits to normality as seen in the histograms and QQ
plots. Moreover, the removal of red and blue letter days from the original data resulted in a
decreased standard deviation for more than 80% of the sample. From a sectoral perspective,
the Banks Index demonstrated the most stability out of all the indices, in terms of mean
daily returns and standard deviation.
Table 9: Number of equities with daily returns that are statistically significant
at a 90% confidence level (α = 0.10) and reject the null hypothesis of Gaussianity
Data Categories
Original Data after Data after
Data Removing Red Removing Red and
Letter Days Blue Letter Days
Anderson-Darling 56 56 56
Lilliefors 54 55 53
Shapiro-Wilk 56 56 56
Jarque-Bera 56 56 55
D’Agostino-Pearson 36 35 34
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Table 10: Number of equities with daily returns that are statistically significant
at a 95% confidence level (α = 0.05) and reject the null hypothesis of Gaussianity
Data Categories
Original Data after Data after
Data Removing Red Removing Red and
Letter Days Blue Letter Days
Anderson-Darling 56 56 56
Lilliefors 56 54 55
Shapiro-Wilk 56 56 56
Jarque-Bera 56 56 56
D’Agostino-Pearson 51 55 54
Table 11: Number of equities with daily returns that are statistically significant
at a 99% confidence level (α = 0.01) and reject the null hypothesis of Gaussianity
Data Categories
Original Data after Data after
Data Removing Red Removing Red and
Letter Days Blue Letter Days
Anderson-Darling 54 54 53
Lilliefors 52 50 45
Shapiro-Wilk 56 56 54
Jarque-Bera 55 56 55
D’Agostino-Pearson 26 23 24
When testing for normality using empirical distribution function tests, 92% of the stocks in
the original data in Section 5.1 have returns that are statistically significant at 90%, 95%,
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and 99% confidence levels. Furthermore, the omission of macro-outliers from the original
data yielded the same results as demonstrated in Section 5.2. Additionally, the removal of
micro-outliers from the augmented dataset produced relatively the same output; however,
in the Lilliefors test, the number of equities with returns that are statistically significant
at α = 0.01 decreased by approximately 13% relative to the results from the original data
in Section 5.1. Nonetheless, Table 11 shows that at least 45 stocks in the sample rejected
the null hypothesis at a 99% confidence level for both EDF tests. However, the Nedbank
Group and Truworths International stocks demonstrated relatively good fits to the normal
distribution across all three data categories.
As a correlation-based goodness-of-fit test, Tables 9, 10, and 11 show that the Shapiro-Wilk
test consistently rejected the null hypothesis of normality for at least 96% of the sample
across all three significance levels and data categories. Since the SW test is regarded to be
the most powerful normality test, it can be said that majority of South African single-listed
equities in the sample are highly non-normal.
Across all three data categories, the Jarque-Bera test produced statistically significant results
where at least 98% of the sample rejected the null hypothesis at either a 90%, 95%, or 99%
confidence level as demonstrated by Tables 9, 10, and 11. This means that, through the
sample moments, single-listed stocks on the JSE demonstrate significant departures from
normality. In other words, they exhibit skewness and/or excess kurtosis which means that
asset allocation frameworks assuming the Gaussian distribution may lead to a quantifiable
misestimation of portfolio risk (Sheikh and Qiao, 2009). This is consistent with the related
literature on the JSE (Page, 1993; Jefferis and Smith, 2005; Mangani, 2007).
In contrast to the results from the abovementioned tests and graphical methods, the
D’Agostino-Pearson test yields different results. At a 90% confidence level, at least 35% of
the sample failed to reject the null hypothesis across all three data categories. Furthermore,
when the confidence level is increased to 99%, no more than 46% of the sample fails to reject
the normality hypothesis. Also, the number of stocks with statistically significant results
decreases across the data categories. This may imply that the removal of macro-outliers and
micro-outliers results in the failure of the DP test to detect departures from normality via the
sample skewness and kurtosis at certain confidence levels. Moreover, the D’Agostino-Pearson
test results in Sections 5.1 to 5.3 may imply that the omission of red and blue letter days leads
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to decreased sample skewness and kurtosis. Thus it reinforces the argument that the removal
of the macro-outliers and micro-outliers leads to improved fits to the normal distribution.
Additionally, the contrasting results emphasises that normality tests may yield contradicting
results, which means that the choice, power, and sensitivity of the test is of paramount
importance to an empirical study (Razali and Wah, 2011). However, it is crucial to note that
the D’Agostino-Pearson test is the only test out of five goodness-of-fit tests used in this study
that is producing these kind of results.
With reference to the histograms and QQ plots, it is important to note that outliers remained
present in the data even after the removal of the a priori outliers. Although this is beyond the
scope of this study, the further presence of outliers may be linked to unforeseen market and/or
sector-specific events. Unforeseen events of heightened market and/or sectoral volatility
in South Africa have come in the form of policy uncertainty, and industrial action in key
sectors, namely manufacturing and mining. In particular, the questionable firing of Nhlanhla
Nene as the Finance Minister in December 2015 (locally known as “Nenegate”) booted the
Rand into a tailspin, causing it to weaken substantially. However, Kotze (2017) argues that
the depreciation of the Rand had gained momentum since 2011 prior to Nenegate. The
subsequent Cabinet reshuffles shattered investor confidence which eventually resulted in S&P
Global Ratings downgrading the long-term outlook for the country’s foreign currency debt
and local currency sovereign debt (Karodia and Soni, 2016).
South African single-listed equities are non-normal on the basis of the following goodness-of-fit
criteria: (i) empirical distribution functions, (ii) regression and correlation, and (iii) moments.
Furthermore, the stocks exhibit non-normality across three different categories: (i) original
data, (ii) data after the omission of predetermined macro-outliers, and (iii) data after the
omission of a priori macro-outliers and micro-outliers. This means that asset pricing models
and/or asset allocation frameworks which are premised on the Gaussian distribution (including
CAPM) misestimate the frequency and magnitude of extreme negative events, as well as
their impact on portfolio efficiency and returns (Sheikh and Qiao, 2009; Ward and Muller,
2012). It also highlights the need for asset pricing models and asset allocation frameworks
that factor non-normality, and the asymmetric risk preferences of investors (Sharpe, 1964;
Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966; Sharpe, 1994).
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6 Conclusion
This study has carried out an investigation into whether the removal of a priori outliers from
South African single-listed equities results in improved fits to the normal distribution. This
has required not only an empirical evaluation of goodness-of-fit methodologies, but also an
examination of the various aspects relating to the normality assumption in finance. In doing
this, it has been shown how interrelated the components are with each other.
The study utilised the daily returns of 56 stocks over the period 1 January 2016 to 31
December 2017 on a 65-day rolling basis. Since normality is one of the core tenets in financial
economics, it would be of interest for investors, asset managers, and the academic community
to know how the omission of a priori macro-outliers and micro-outliers affects the return
distribution of equities. The macro-outliers consisted of US nonfarm payrolls and South
African Reserve Bank repo rate announcements. Moreover, the micro-outliers included
preliminary and final earnings announcements. The single-listed equities in the sample were
filtered on the basis of the following criteria: (i) acquired and delisted equities, (ii) liquidity
concerns, (iii) consistent values for the sample period, (iv) accessibility by investors, and (v)
the magnitude of ADR exposure. This study omitted the outliers, and thereafter implemented
graphical methods and five statistical goodness-of-fit tests to determine whether the stocks
follow the Gaussian distribution. Furthermore, the goodness-of-fit tests were categorised into
(i) empirical distribution function, (ii) regression and correlation, and (iii) moment tests.
Upon fitting the normal distribution to the data, it became apparent that the majority of
the data exhibited fat tails and positive skewness. Furthermore, this persisted despite the
removal of macro-outliers and micro-outliers; however, the normal quantile-quantile plots,
and histograms clearly show improved fits to normality as a result of the outlier removal.
As such, it is important to note that the positive skewness implies that deviations from the
mean have a stronger probability of being positive, which appeals to investors. Moreover, the
fat tails will tend to overestimate the likelihood of attaining the mean return.
The empirical results demonstrated that at least 90% of South African single-listed equities in
the sample demonstrated significant departures from normality across three data categories:
(i) original data, (ii) data after the omission of predetermined macro-outliers, and (iii) data
after the omission of predetermined macro-outliers and micro-outliers. However, in the
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D’Agostino-Pearson test, normality was found to be a reasonable assumption for 41% of
the stocks in the sample across the data categories. This divergent result was found to be
attributed to the decreased asymmetry and kurtosis after the removal of the a priori data.
Thus it affirms the view that the removal of the red and blue letter days has resulted in
improved fits to the Gaussian distribution. Furthermore, the contrasting result highlighted the
differences in the power, sensitivity, and underlying assumptions of normality tests. Overall,
despite the removal of the predetermined macro-outliers and micro-outliers, the empirical
results are consistent with international and local evidence (Page, 1993; Peiro, 1994; Aparicio
and Estrada, 2001; Mangani, 2007). This also affirms the need for asset allocation and pricing
models that consider non-normality, and the loss averse and irrational nature of investors in
financial decision-making.
6.1 Considerations for Future Research
This study observed that outlying values continued to be present in the stock return data
even after the red and blue letter days were removed. The outliers could be attributed to
unforeseen firm and/or market events. The sample period used in this study included several
unpredictable market events, including Nenegate, Donald Trump’s presidential win, and
industrial action in the South African platinum sector. As such, there is potential for address-
ing the removal of the unforeseen “outliers” as an extension of this research. Furthermore,
special attention would need to be given to the methodology and ensuring the robustness
thereof. Moreover, this study could be replicated in different countries. Additionally, another
research avenue would be examining the goodness-of-fit of daily, weekly, and monthly return
data on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) to a certain empirical distribution. This
would build on Chen et al. (2003) and Mangani (2007) in order to determine whether the
goodness-of-fit results vary with time.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, a concern in the research was the paucity of literature on the
equity return distributions in South Africa and other emerging markets. Although there is
a general consensus on the non-Gaussian behaviour of stock market returns, heavy-tailed
distributions need to be considered in the South African context. Furthermore, stock market
returns in developed markets were proven to follow a power law distribution, which has
created a lacuna in the academic literature as to whether the aforementioned is true for
emerging markets like South Africa. More research should be focused in this field as this
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study mainly dealt with the distributional properties of JSE returns; notwithstanding that
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Chang, C.-L., Jiménez-Mart́ın, J.-Á., Maasoumi, E., McAleer, M. and Perez Amaral, T. 2016.
‘Choosing expected shortfall over VaR in Basel III using stochastic dominance’, USC-INET
Research Paper (16-05).
Chen, J. T., Gupta, A. K. and Troskie, C. G. 2003. ‘The distribution of stock returns when
the market is up’, Communications in Statistics-Theory and Methods 32(8), 1541–1558.
Cheon, Y. S., Christensen, T. E. and Smith Bamber, L. 2001. ‘Factors associated with
differences in the magnitude of abnormal returns around nyse versus nasdaq firms’ earnings
announcements’, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 28(9-10), 1073–1108.
69
Chión, S. J., Veliz, C. and Carlos, N. 2008. ‘On the normality of stock return distributions:
Latin american markets, 2000-2007’, Journal of CENTRUM Cathedra 1(2), 90–108.
Cizeau, P., Liu, Y., Meyer, M., Peng, C.-K. and Stanley, H. E. 1997. ‘Volatility distribution
in the S&P500 stock index’, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 245(3-
4), 441–445.
Clark, P. K. 1973. ‘A subordinated stochastic process model with finite variance for speculative
prices’, Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society pp. 135–155.
Clement, M., Frankel, R. and Miller, J. 2003. ‘Confirming management earnings forecasts,
earnings uncertainty, and stock returns’, Journal of Accounting Research 41(4), 653–679.
Conover, W. 1999. ‘Practical nonparametric statistics, john wiley & sons’, INC, New York .
Cramér, H. 1928. ‘On the composition of elementary errors: First paper: Mathematical
deductions’, Scandinavian Actuarial Journal 1928(1), 13–74.
Crow, E. L. and Shimizu, K. 1987. Lognormal Distributions, Marcel Dekker New York.
D’Agostino, R. B., Belanger, A. and D’Agostino Jr, R. B. 1990. ‘A suggestion for using
powerful and informative tests of normality’, The American Statistician 44(4), 316–321.
D’Agostino, R. B. and Stephens, M. A. 1986. ‘Goodness-of-fit techniques (statistics, a series
of textbooks and monographs)’, Dekker 68, 1.
D’Agostino, R. and Pearson, E. S. 1973. ‘Tests for departure from normality. empirical results
for the distributions of b2 and
√
b’, Biometrika 60(3), 613–622.
Danielsson, J. and De Vries, C. G. 2000. ‘Value-at-risk and extreme returns’, Annales
d’Economie et de Statistique pp. 239–270.
Danielsson, J., Jorgensen, B. N., Sarma, M. and de Vries, C. G. 2006. ‘Comparing downside
risk measures for heavy tailed distributions’, Economics Letters 92(2), 202–208.
Das, K. R. and Imon, A. 2016. ‘A brief review of tests for normality’, American Journal of
Theoretical and Applied Statistics 5(1), 5–12.
70
David, P. A. 1985. ‘Clio and the Economics of QWERTY’, The American Economic Review
75(2), 332–337.
Davis, M., Bachelier, L., Etheridge, A. and Samuelson, P. A. 2011. Louis Bachelier’s Theory
of Speculation: The Origins of Modern Finance, Princeton University Press.
Dhaene, J., Goovaerts, M. J. and Kaas, R. 2003. ‘Economic capital allocation derived from
risk measures’, North American Actuarial Journal 7(2), 44–56.
Duffie, D. 2010. Dynamic asset pricing theory, Princeton University Press.
Dufour, J.-M., Farhat, A., Gardiol, L. and Khalaf, L. 1998. ‘Simulation-based finite sample
normality tests in linear regressions’, The Econometrics Journal 1(1), 154–173.
Edgeworth, F. Y. 1887. ‘On observations relating to several quantities’, Hermathena 6(13), 279–
285.
Eita, J. H. 2012. ‘Inflation and stock market returns in south africa’, The International
Business &amp; Economics Research Journal (Online) 11(6), 677.
Epstein, L. G. and Turnbull, S. M. 1980. ‘Capital asset prices and the temporal resolution of
uncertainty’, The journal of finance 35(3), 627–643.
Esin, C. and Gupta, R. 2017. ‘Does the us. macroeconomic news make the south african
stock market riskier?’, The Journal of Developing Areas 51(4), 15–27.
Fama, E. F. 1963. ‘Mandelbrot and the stable paretian hypothesis’, The Journal of Business
36(4), 420–429.
Fama, E. F. 1965. ‘The behavior of stock-market prices’, The Journal of Business 38(1), 34–
105.
Fama, E. F. 1976. Foundations of finance: portfolio decisions and securities prices, Basic
Books (AZ).
Farmer, J. D. and Lillo, F. 2004. ‘On the origin of power-law tails in price fluctuations’,
Quantitative Finance 4(1), 7–11.
71
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 2004. ‘Education | Why does the Federal Reserve
consider nonfarm payroll employment to be an important economic indicator? ’.
URL: https://www.frbsf.org/education/publications/doctor-
econ/2004/june/nonfarm-jobs-payroll-employment/ [2018, July 17]
Ferreira, R. and Krige, J. 2011. ‘The application of fundamental indexing to the south african
equity market for the period 1996 to 2009’, Investment Analysts Journal 40(73), 1–12.
Firer, C. and McLeod, H. 1999. ‘Equities, bonds, cash and inflation: Historical performance
in South Africa 1925 to 1998’, Investment Analysts Journal 28(50), 7–28.
Foster, G., Olsen, C. and Shevlin, T. 1984. ‘Earnings releases, anomalies, and the behavior of
security returns’, Accounting Review pp. 574–603.
Freeman, J. n.d.. ‘Normal distribution’.
URL: http://critical-numbers.group.shef.ac.uk/glossary/normaldistribution.html
Funke, N. and Matsuda, A. 2006. ‘Macroeconomic news and stock returns in the United
States and Germany’, German Economic Review 7(2), 189–210.
Gabaix, X. 2009. ‘Power laws in economics and finance’, Annual Review of Economics
1, 255–93.
Gabaix, X., Gopikrishnan, P., Plerou, V. and Stanley, H. E. 2003. ‘A theory of power-law
distributions in financial market fluctuations’, Nature 423(6937), 267.
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A Stocks analysed and/or used in the Data Analysis
A.1 Top 100 stocks on the JSE Main Board as of 31 December
2015, listed by market capitalisation
Ranking Company Name Market Capitalisation in ZAR
1. Naspers 929 807 597 568
2. SASOL 273 192 763 392
3. MTN Group 245 247 606 784
4. FirstRand 237 674 004 480
5. Vodacom Group 226 779 070 464
6. Standard Bank Group 183 671 619 584
7. Aspen Pharmacare 141 231 620 096
8. Sanlam 131 158 212 608
9. Remgro 126 678 605 824
10. ABSA Group 121 643 745 280
11. Mediclinic International 116 509 138 944
12. Bidvest Group 110 083 014 656
13. Investec 99 444 203 520
14. Woolworths Holdings 95 961 382 912
15. Nedbank Group 93 251 035 136
16. Discovery 86 075 539 456
17. Shoprite Holdings 82 069 635 072
18. RMB Holdings 78 504 820 736
19. Growthpoint Properties 63 451 062 272
20. Capitec Bank Holdings 62 272 073 728
21. Tiger Brands 60 778 590 208
22. RMI Holdings 57 510 998 016
23. Mr Price Group 53 425 790 976
24. Fortress REIT 51 906 932 736
25. PSG Group 51 579 006 976
26. Anglo American Platinum 49 982 840 832
27. Netcare 49 400 999 936
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28. Redefine Property 47 049 740 288
29. Resilient REIT 44 518 719 488
30. AngloGold Ashanti 43 232 219 136
31. Truworths International 39 162 720 256
32. Pioneer Foods Group 37 016 616 960
33. Life Healthcare 36 769 542 144
34. Distell Group 36 645 822 464
35. MMI Holdings 34 604 748 800
36. Sappi 34 098 350 080
37. Telkom SA SOC 33 898 608 640
38. Liberty Holdings 32 964 788 224
39. Gold Fields 32 837 281 792
40. Spar Group 31 898 603 520
41. Pick ’n Pay Stores 31 749 271 552
42. AVI 26 856 232 960
43. TFG 25 959 987 200
44. Tsogo Sun Holdings 25 390 190 592
45. Hyprop Investment 25 140 516 864
46. Oakbay Resources & Energy 24 231 999 488
47. Imperial Logistics 24 204 091 392
48. Clicks Group 21 906 259 968
49 Santam 21 817 403 392
50 Massmart Holdings 21 713 633 280
51. Sibanye Gold 20 933 812 224
52. Curro Holdings 20 623 386 624
53. Coronation Fund Managers 18 504 372 224
54. Impala Platinum 18 398 851 072
55. EOH Holdings 18 130 001 920
56. Nampak 17 085 059 072
57. KAP Industrial Holdings 16 842 460 160
58. Exxaro Resources 15 771 186 176
59. NewGold Issuer 15 545 400 320
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60. Pick n Pay Holdings 14 762 974 208
61. Oceana Group 13 984 560 128
62. Attacq 13 640 287 232
63. Super Group 13 623 701 504
64. Northam Platinum 13 453 126 656
65. Kumba Iron Ore 13 269 942 272
66. Barloworld 13 180 559 360
67. Famous Brands Ld 12 975 616 000
68. Tongaat Hulett 12 576 271 360
69. Reunert 12 548 020 224
70. Italtile 12 193 327 104
71. Hosken Consolidated Investments 12 150 446 080
72. JSE 11 120 290 816
73. Vukile Property Fund 10 945 576 960
74. AECI 10 926 559 232
75. Datatec 10 786 580 480
76. SA Corporate Realty 10 521 595 904
77. Sun International 10 161 453 056
78. Investec Property Fund 10 127 835 136
79. PSG Konsult 9 977 165 824
80. African Rainbow 9 469 257 728
81. PPC 9 322 846 208
82. Zeder Investment 9 182 802 944
83. Omnia Holdings 9 091 893 248
84. Adcock Ingram Holdings 8 783 887 360
85. Assore 8 669 594 624
86. Grindrod 8 609 226 752
87. Capevin Holdings 8 492 996 608
88. Emira Property Fund 8 276 016 640
89. Blue Label Telecommunications 8 195 284 992
90. Alexander Forbes 7 954 661 888
91. Arrowhead Property 7 893 451 264
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92. Trencor 7 879 526 400
93. Mpact 7 790 097 408
94. Ilovo Sugar (Pty) 7 786 346 496
95. SATRIX 40 7 677 830 144
96. Cashbuild 7 556 943 360
97. Wilson Bayly Homes 7 156 906 496
98. Transaction Capital 7 038 203 392
99. Harmony Gold Mining 6 813 922 816
100. Advtech 6 627 766 784
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A.2 South African Equities used in the Econometric Analysis
Ranking Company Name Market Capitalisation in ZAR
1. SASOL 273 192 763 392
2. MTN Group 245 247 606 784
3. FirstRand 237 674 004 480
4. Vodacom Group 226 779 070 464
5. Standard Bank Group 183 671 619 584
6. Aspen Pharmacare 141 231 620 096
7. Sanlam 131 158 212 608
8. Remgro 126 678 605 824
9. ABSA Group 121 643 745 280
10. Bidvest Group 110 083 014 656
11. Nedbank Group 93 251 035 136
12. Discovery 86 075 539 456
13. Shoprite Holdings 82 069 635 072
14. RMB Holdings 78 504 820 736
15. Capitec Bank Holdings 62 272 073 728
16. Tiger Brands 60 778 590 208
17. RMI Holdings 57 510 998 016
18. Mr Price Group 53 425 790 976
19. PSG Group 51 579 006 976
20. Anglo American Platinum 49 982 840 832
21. Netcare 49 400 999 936
22. Truworths International 39 162 720 256
23. Pioneer Foods Group 37 016 616 960
24. Life Healthcare 36 769 542 144
25. MMI Holdings 34 604 748 800
26. Sappi 34 098 350 080
27. Telkom SA SOC 33 898 608 640
28. Liberty Holdings 32 964 788 224
29. Spar Group 31 898 603 520
30. Pick ’n Pay Stores 31 749 271 552
31. AVI 26 856 232 960
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32. TFG 25 959 987 200
33. Tsogo Sun Holdings 25 390 190 592
34. Imperial Logistics 24 204 091 392
35. Clicks Group 21 906 259 968
36. Santam 21 817 403 392
37. Massmart Holdings 21 713 633 280
38. Curro Holdings 20 623 386 624
39. Coronation Fund Managers 18 504 372 224
40. Impala Platinum 18 398 851 072
41. EOH Holdings 18 130 001 920
42. Nampak 17 085 059 072
43. KAP Industrial Holdings 16 842 460 160
44. Exxaro Resources 15 771 186 176
45. Oceana Group 13 984 560 128
46. Super Group 13 623 701 504
47. Northam Platinum 13 453 126 656
48. Kumba Iron Ore 13 269 942 272
49. Barloworld 13 180 559 360
50. Famous Brands 12 975 616 000
51. Tongaat Hulett 12 576 271 360
52. Reunert 12 548 020 224
53. Italtile 12 193 327 104
54. Hosken Consolidated Investments 12 150 446 080
55. JSE Limited 11 120 290 816
56. AECI 10 926 559 232
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A.3 FTSE/JSE Africa Sector Indices used in the Econometric
Analysis
Stocks used in the data analysis as shown in Appendix A.2 have been classified according to
their member indices, and ordered by market capitalisation.
1. Banks
1.1 FirstRand








3. Electronic and Electrical Equipment
3.1 Reunert
4. Equity Investment Instruments
4.1 RMI Holdings
4.2 Hosken Consolidated Investments
5. Fixed Line Telecommunications
5.1 Telkom SA SOC






















10.4 KAP Industrial Holdings
10.5 Barloworld
11. General Retailers



























18. Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology
18.1 Aspen Pharmacare
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19. Software and Computer Services
19.1 EOH Holdings
20. Travel and Leisure
20.1 Tsogo Sun Holdings
20.2 Famous Brands




B Descriptive Statistics of the Data
B.1 Summary Statistics of the Original Data
Equity Mean Standard Skewness Kurtosis Standard
Deviation Error
SASOL 0.000016 0.018865 -0.323452 3.321094 0.000792
MTN Group -0.000248 0.023431 -0.766116 11.889182 0.000984
FirstRand 0.000767 0.019785 0.103324 1.585797 0.000831
Vodacom Group -0.000045 0.012526 -0.135078 4.218090 0.000526
Standard Bank
Group
0.001076 0.018986 0.091942 1.092060 0.000797
Aspen Pharma-
care
-0.000317 0.017959 0.744702 5.244732 0.000754
Sanlam 0.000518 0.020191 -0.193354 2.152035 0.000848
Remgro -0.000175 0.015269 0.258953 0.608372 0.000641
ABSA Group 0.000370 0.020764 0.146080 2.134608 0.000872
Bidvest Group 0.001467 0.017977 0.193460 1.251972 0.000755
Nedbank Group 0.000731 0.018093 0.006468 0.862577 0.000760
Discovery 0.000441 0.017730 0.080666 2.466256 0.000745
Shoprite Hold-
ings
0.000943 0.019017 0.504349 2.901165 0.000799
RMB Holdings 0.000553 0.017848 0.138591 1.452201 0.000750
Capitec Bank
Holdings
0.000812 0.018591 -0.509688 6.817335 0.000781
Tiger Brands 0.000364 0.016404 -0.593871 2.506043 0.000689
RMI Holdings 0.000067 0.015381 -0.050208 0.849432 0.000646
Mr Price Group 0.000542 0.024589 -1.291940 11.733644 0.001033
PSG Group -0.000045 0.020450 -0.384604 1.732582 0.000859
Anglo American
Platinum
0.000918 0.029957 0.625456 3.211431 0.001258
Netcare -0.000356 0.016300 -0.511572 4.622544 0.000685
Truworths Inter-
national
0.000164 0.022859 0.045534 1.034871 0.000960
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Pioneer Foods
Group
-0.000411 0.019947 0.197664 2.023130 0.000838
Life Healthcare -0.000334 0.015762 0.029329 1.426984 0.000662
MMI Holdings 0.000047 0.018272 -0.053187 1.561057 0.000767
Sappi 0.000295 0.019331 0.321392 0.933185 0.000812
Telkom SA SOC -0.000247 0.021294 -0.206078 2.310700 0.000894
Liberty Holdings 0.000170 0.017846 -0.871278 4.243928 0.000749
Spar Group 0.000164 0.016631 0.016909 1.779454 0.000698
Pick ’n Pay
Stores
0.000024 0.017184 -0.023801 0.633556 0.000722
AVI 0.000608 0.014394 -0.272779 1.158876 0.000604
TFG (The Fos-
chini Group)
0.000953 0.023622 0.151343 2.555918 0.000992
Tsogo Sun Hold-
ings
-0.000184 0.016496 0.347934 1.965708 0.000693
Imperial Logis-
tics
0.001195 0.025780 -0.012221 2.174582 0.001083
Clicks Group 0.001315 0.016311 0.265903 1.840058 0.000685
Santam 0.000885 0.015770 0.904997 5.909035 0.000662
Massmart Hold-
ings
0.000897 0.024907 0.248511 1.218348 0.001046
Curro Holdings -0.000907 0.018409 -0.025422 1.747302 0.000773
Coronation Fund
Managers
0.000807 0.019350 0.353880 2.254246 0.000813
Impala Platinum -0.000075 0.036339 0.309756 2.269068 0.001526
EOH Holdings -0.001929 0.033293 -3.846743 52.079504 0.001398
Nampak -0.001077 0.024657 -0.154672 4.241481 0.001035
KAP Industrial
Holdings
0.000307 0.017239 -0.499537 5.123352 0.000724
Exxaro Re-
sources
0.001602 0.031791 0.186491 3.588149 0.001335
Oceana Group -0.000585 0.018814 -0.135630 4.580253 0.000790
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Super Group -0.000032 0.015850 0.056439 2.311063 0.000666
Northam Plat-
inum
0.000492 0.027849 0.322536 1.440966 0.001170
Kumba Iron Ore 0.003380 0.042567 0.534197 5.417860 0.001788
Barloworld 0.001731 0.025630 0.351386 1.278311 0.001076
Famous Brands -0.000345 0.017415 -0.795036 4.617983 0.000731
Tongaat Hulett 0.000096 0.015214 0.391403 1.799405 0.000639
Reunert 0.000235 0.013171 -0.173610 1.757362 0.000553




0.000401 0.014819 0.251344 1.557760 0.000622
JSE Limited 0.000715 0.016939 -0.026041 0.769532 0.000711
AECI 0.000412 0.013769 0.318816 2.689190 0.000578
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B.2 Summary Statistics of the Data after the removal of Red Let-
ter Days
Equity Mean Standard Skewness Kurtosis Standard
Deviation Error
SASOL 0.000051 0.018809 -0.349650 3.644424 0.000821
MTN Group -0.000313 0.023879 -0.781721 11.860776 0.001042
FirstRand 0.000801 0.019602 0.088072 1.703841 0.000856
Vodacom Group -0.000075 0.012593 -0.184124 4.452341 0.000550
Standard Bank
Group
0.001040 0.019019 0.072343 1.213130 0.000830
Aspen Pharma-
care
-0.000214 0.018293 0.737919 5.204310 0.000798
Sanlam 0.000780 0.019959 -0.065887 1.736667 0.000871
Remgro -0.000191 0.015331 0.217033 0.604603 0.000669
ABSA Group 0.000092 0.020694 0.128835 2.267524 0.000903
Bidvest Group 0.001561 0.017859 0.226455 1.401848 0.000779
Nedbank Group 0.000590 0.018008 -0.043331 0.969872 0.000786
Discovery 0.000595 0.017713 0.116020 2.635097 0.000773
Shoprite Hold-
ings
0.000969 0.018972 0.496577 3.169058 0.000828
RMB Holdings 0.000760 0.017687 0.125833 1.554194 0.000772
Capitec Bank
Holdings
0.000573 0.018160 -0.844451 7.134585 0.000793
Tiger Brands 0.000059 0.016371 -0.649610 2.768877 0.000714
RMI Holdings 0.000237 0.015450 -0.010684 0.846918 0.000674
Mr Price Group 0.000327 0.024953 -1.339020 11.871147 0.001089
PSG Group -0.000013 0.020312 -0.389901 1.684905 0.000886
Anglo American
Platinum
0.000795 0.029880 0.627902 3.530201 0.001304
Netcare -0.000328 0.015520 -0.240887 1.930212 0.000677
Truworths Inter-
national
0.000097 0.023066 0.043729 1.089774 0.001007
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Pioneer Foods
Group
-0.000377 0.020043 0.267221 1.965055 0.000875
Life Healthcare -0.000421 0.015763 0.083428 1.586369 0.000688
MMI Holdings 0.000022 0.018159 -0.085547 1.738827 0.000793
Sappi 0.000250 0.019195 0.338738 0.895940 0.000838
Telkom SA SOC -0.000446 0.021406 -0.276122 2.326612 0.000934
Liberty Holdings 0.000587 0.017019 -0.454266 1.886564 0.000743
Spar Group 0.000084 0.016789 -0.009043 1.810361 0.000733
Pick ’n Pay
Stores
0.000300 0.017216 -0.056006 0.705036 0.000751
AVI 0.000851 0.014433 -0.259846 1.225880 0.000630
TFG (The Fos-
chini Group)
0.001004 0.023591 0.136982 2.740960 0.001030
Tsogo Sun Hold-
ings
-0.000106 0.016633 0.327753 1.952932 0.000726
Imperial Logis-
tics
0.001138 0.026008 -0.006058 2.254544 0.001135
Clicks Group 0.001612 0.016312 0.280403 1.996627 0.000712
Santam 0.000876 0.015950 0.933462 6.076401 0.000696
Massmart Hold-
ings
0.001034 0.024864 0.243330 1.211380 0.001085
Curro Holdings -0.000639 0.018503 0.048760 1.659044 0.000808
Coronation Fund
Managers
0.000447 0.019087 0.254899 2.205909 0.000833
Impala Platinum -0.000077 0.036050 0.356643 2.462228 0.001573
EOH Holdings -0.001975 0.033962 -3.901860 51.857344 0.001482
Nampak -0.001379 0.024901 -0.138843 4.413792 0.001087
KAP Industrial
Holdings
0.000321 0.017526 -0.529864 5.128910 0.000765
Exxaro Re-
sources
0.002005 0.031584 0.283678 3.594619 0.001378
Oceana Group -0.000453 0.018493 0.254321 2.918026 0.000807
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Super Group -0.000124 0.015594 -0.065197 2.257630 0.000681
Northam Plat-
inum
0.000436 0.027064 0.293957 1.484304 0.001181
Kumba Iron Ore 0.003537 0.043066 0.541045 5.523215 0.001880
Barloworld 0.001279 0.025746 0.371064 1.373374 0.001124
Famous Brands -0.000292 0.017601 -0.798057 4.759503 0.000768
Tongaat Hulett -0.000076 0.015106 0.370593 1.989608 0.000659
Reunert 0.000114 0.013289 -0.150731 1.812390 0.000580




0.000302 0.014988 0.255695 1.592561 0.000654
JSE Limited 0.000679 0.017185 -0.030993 0.763610 0.000750
AECI 0.000420 0.013629 0.220116 1.980797 0.000595
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B.3 Summary Statistics of the Data after the removal of Red and
Blue Letter Days
Equity Mean Standard Skewness Kurtosis Standard
Deviation Error
SASOL -0.000141 0.018820 -0.354040 3.665312 0.000828
MTN Group -0.000636 0.023258 -1.042537 12.819864 0.001023
FirstRand 0.000869 0.019641 0.087294 1.713128 0.000863
Vodacom Group 0.000044 0.012461 -0.160272 4.694274 0.000546
Standard Bank
Group
0.000644 0.018481 -0.101751 0.936115 0.000814
Aspen Pharma-
care
-0.000491 0.017970 0.643621 5.089671 0.000788
Sanlam 0.001045 0.019757 -0.028453 1.798924 0.000870
Remgro -0.000032 0.015234 0.235759 0.613394 0.000667
ABSA Group 0.000179 0.020602 0.136974 2.354266 0.000907
Bidvest Group 0.001650 0.017933 0.213422 1.374196 0.000787
Nedbank Group 0.000545 0.017728 -0.090962 0.860605 0.000780
Discovery 0.000469 0.017536 0.116594 2.795380 0.000769
Shoprite Hold-
ings
0.000010 0.017484 0.198005 1.498274 0.000794
RMB Holdings 0.000970 0.017455 0.221500 1.337555 0.000765
Capitec Bank
Holdings
0.000641 0.018236 -0.855278 7.148862 0.000803
Tiger Brands 0.000300 0.016005 -0.553557 2.681599 0.000703
RMI Holdings 0.000166 0.015153 -0.044844 0.834132 0.000664
Mr Price Group 0.000860 0.021810 0.297086 1.762418 0.000984
PSG Group -0.000092 0.020191 -0.412965 1.726457 0.000885
Anglo American
Platinum
0.000611 0.029813 0.655956 3.600589 0.001352
Netcare -0.000330 0.015094 -0.144203 1.677783 0.000663
Truworths Inter-
national
-0.000083 0.022585 0.111664 0.907658 0.001023
99
continued from previous page
Pioneer Foods
Group
-0.000285 0.019677 0.352348 1.987850 0.000865
Life Healthcare -0.000461 0.015089 0.016187 1.031371 0.000662
MMI Holdings 0.000113 0.017618 0.073828 1.184078 0.000775
Sappi 0.000062 0.018963 0.319241 0.937054 0.000835
Telkom SA SOC -0.000545 0.020551 -0.347088 2.266793 0.000901
Liberty Holdings 0.000746 0.016517 -0.378343 1.688886 0.000726
Spar Group -0.000097 0.016678 0.025499 1.861269 0.000750
Pick ’n Pay
Stores
0.000105 0.017200 -0.015472 0.748323 0.000774
AVI 0.000949 0.014311 -0.170712 0.941485 0.000631
TFG 0.000691 0.023464 0.167618 3.064542 0.001058
Tsogo Sun Hold-
ings
-0.000181 0.016491 0.277153 1.903303 0.000722
Imperial Logis-
tics
0.000813 0.025759 -0.031972 2.358159 0.001130
Clicks Group 0.001534 0.016457 0.305827 2.042164 0.000740
Santam 0.000648 0.015678 0.855321 6.071924 0.000688
Massmart Hold-
ings
0.000504 0.024393 0.105217 0.974978 0.001104
Curro Holdings -0.000231 0.018106 0.194273 1.614888 0.000815
Coronation Fund
Managers
0.000371 0.018928 0.228006 2.276453 0.000829
Impala Platinum 0.000158 0.036225 0.350947 2.580363 0.001636
EOH Holdings -0.001832 0.033981 -3.928957 52.212005 0.001489
Nampak -0.001331 0.022958 -0.063886 1.216194 0.001009
KAP Industrial
Holdings
0.000063 0.017363 -0.564726 5.359377 0.000761
Exxaro Re-
sources
0.002700 0.031370 0.410548 3.623698 0.001413
Oceana Group -0.000490 0.018276 0.333693 2.977331 0.000801
Super Group 0.000207 0.015026 0.259689 1.141403 0.000659
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Northam Plat-
inum
0.000491 0.027298 0.303240 1.518187 0.001229
Kumba Iron Ore 0.003263 0.041718 0.532439 6.174376 0.001844
Barloworld 0.001300 0.025300 0.419340 1.447270 0.001113
Famous Brands -0.000247 0.017211 -0.679693 4.503384 0.000755
Tongaat Hulett -0.000104 0.015130 0.372119 1.991683 0.000663
Reunert -0.000099 0.013044 -0.253970 1.740947 0.000571




0.000266 0.015003 0.260799 1.606340 0.000657
JSE Limited 0.000884 0.016912 0.107063 0.264616 0.000742
AECI 0.000261 0.013353 0.095548 1.733425 0.000585
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Number of Remaining Observations = 518
549
550
E.1.2 Standard Bank Group












Number of Remaining Observations = 521
557
558
E.1.6 Capitec Bank Holdings
Number of Remaining Observations = 516
559
560
E.1.7 Results from Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Normality Test Statistics
AD LF SW JB DP
FirstRand 2.3023 *** 0.049185*** 0.98142*** 61.94*** 0.818590
Standard Bank
Group
1.4606*** 0.045427** 0.99046*** 18.904*** -0.95174
ABSA Group 2.8021*** 0.055077*** 0.97508*** 117.32*** 1.27870
Nedbank Group 0.84013** 0.036294 0.99269** 15.903*** -0.851240
RMB Holdings 1.395*** 0.038744* 0.98602*** 41.675*** 2.06310**
Capitec Bank Hold-
ings











Number of Remaining Observations = 521
564
565
E.2.3 Results from Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Normality Test Statistics
AD LF SW JB DP
SASOL 3.2497*** 0.055991*** 0.96263*** 292.19*** - 3.22780***





E.3 Electronic and Electrical Equipment
E.3.1 Reunert
Number of Remaining Observations = 521
567
568
E.3.2 Results from Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Normality Test Statistics
AD LF SW JB DP





E.4 Equity Investment Instruments
E.4.1 RMI Holdings
Number of Remaining Observations = 520
570
571
E.4.2 Hosken Consolidated Investments
Number of Remaining Observations = 521
572
573
E.4.3 Results from Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Normality Test Statistics
AD LF SW JB DP
RMI Holdings 1.7271*** 0.043025** 0.98922*** 14.551*** -0.421880
Hosken Consoli-
dated Investments





E.5 Fixed Line Telecommunications
E.5.1 Telkom SA SOC
Number of Remaining Observations = 520
575
576
E.5.2 Results from Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Normality Test Statistics
AD LF SW JB DP





E.6 Food and Drug Retailers
E.6.1 Shoprite Holdings




Number of Remaining Observations = 494
580
581
E.6.3 Pick ’n Pay Stores




Number of Remaining Observations = 494
584
585
E.6.5 Results from Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Normality Test Statistics
AD LF SW JB DP
Shoprite Holdings 1.5011*** 0.053895*** 0.98624*** 46.849*** 1.78480*
Spar Group 4.5057*** 0.077617*** 0.96964*** 69.012*** 0.234010
Pick ’n Pay Stores 1.5838*** 0.049153*** 0.99097*** 10.948*** -0.142010







Number of Remaining Observations = 519
587
588
E.7.2 Pioneer Foods Group












Number of Remaining Observations = 521
595
596
E.7.6 Results from Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Normality Test Statistics
AD LF SW JB DP
Tiger Brands 2.2708*** 0.054518*** 0.96869*** 90.766*** -4.88510***
Pioneer Foods
Group
1.3029*** 0.044532** 0.98168*** 93.145*** 3.21630***
AVI 0.97071** 0.036149 0.99122*** 20.678*** -1.58830
Oceana Group 4.3318*** 0.067323*** 0.95975*** 196.52*** 3.06290***





E.8 Forestry and Paper
E.8.1 Sappi
Number of Remaining Observations = 516
598
599
E.8.2 Results from Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Normality Test Statistics
AD LF SW JB DP







Number of Remaining Observations = 521
601
602
E.9.2 Coronation Fund Managers




Number of Remaining Observations = 520
605
606
E.9.4 Results from Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Normality Test Statistics
AD LF SW JB DP
PSG Group 2.6203*** 0.059389*** 0.97651*** 77.345*** -3.74760***
Coronation Fund
Managers
2.5521*** 0.060948*** 0.97527*** 113.72*** 2.12230**















Number of Remaining Observations = 518
612
613
E.10.4 KAP Industrial Holdings




Number of Remaining Observations = 517
616
617
E.10.6 Results from Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Normality Test Statistics
AD LF SW JB DP
Remgro 1.4113*** 0.047191*** 0.9906*** 12.511*** 2.19270**
Bidvest Group 1.4062*** 0.052578*** 0.98735*** 43.297*** 1.9857**
Nampak 2.8026*** 0.058502*** 0.98283*** 31.065*** -0.599590
KAP Industrial
Holdings
7.9674*** 0.096213*** 0.93362*** 635.29*** -4.9771***






E.11.1 Mr Price Group




















Number of Remaining Observations = 492
629
630
E.11.7 Results from Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Normality Test Statistics
AD LF SW JB DP
Mr Price Group 1.7269*** 0.046904** 0.98055*** 68.573*** 2.66480***
Truworths Interna-
tional
0.76449** 0.028376 0.99125*** 16.937*** 1.01480
TFG 2.2526*** 0.058873*** 0.97212*** 189.42*** 1.52540
Massmart Holdings 1.9268*** 0.050813*** 0.98779*** 19.352*** 0.95751
Curro Holdings 3.6829*** 0.068934*** 0.97654*** 54.779*** 1.76580*





E.12 Healthcare Equipment and Services
E.12.1 Netcare




Number of Remaining Observations = 520
634
635
E.12.3 Results from Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Normality Test Statistics
AD LF SW JB DP
Netcare 1.8128*** 0.043422** 0.98192*** 60.671*** -1.34940






E.13.1 Kumba Iron Ore
Number of Remaining Observations = 512
637
638
E.13.2 Results from Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Normality Test Statistics
AD LF SW JB DP











Number of Remaining Observations = 520
642
643
E.14.3 Results from Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Normality Test Statistics
AD LF SW JB DP
Imperial Logistics 3.6162*** 0.065949*** 0.96961*** 117.11*** -0.30085



















Number of Remaining Observations = 517
651
652
E.15.5 Results from Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Normality Test Statistics
AD LF SW JB DP
Sanlam 1.8255*** 0.045195** 0.9811*** 67.422*** -0.266740
MMI Holdings 1.562*** 0.053793*** 0.98753*** 29.507*** 0.692010
Discovery 4.2022*** 0.06466*** 0.96239*** 165.87*** 1.09360






E.16.1 Anglo American Platinum












Number of Remaining Observations = 493
660
661
E.16.5 Results from Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Normality Test Statistics
AD LF SW JB DP
Anglo American
Platinum
3.8224*** 0.079393*** 0.95842*** 290.03*** 5.48750***
Impala Platinum 3.9905*** 0.066083*** 0.96488*** 141.91*** 3.12140***
Exxaro Resources 2.669*** 0.057084*** 0.96197*** 276.29*** 3.6282***







Number of Remaining Observations = 520
663
664
E.17.2 Results from Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Normality Test Statistics
AD LF SW JB DP





E.18 Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology
E.18.1 Aspen Pharmacare
Number of Remaining Observations = 520
666
667
E.18.2 Results from Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Normality Test Statistics
AD LF SW JB DP





E.19 Software and Computer Services
E.19.1 EOH Holdings
Number of Remaining Observations = 521
669
670
E.19.2 Results from Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Normality Test Statistics
AD LF SW JB DP





E.20 Travel and Leisure
E.20.1 Tsogo Sun Holdings




Number of Remaining Observations = 518
674
675
E.20.3 Results from Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Normality Test Statistics
AD LF SW JB DP
Tsogo Sun Holdings 3.1432*** 0.062437*** 0.97716*** 82.999*** 2.56790**





E.21 Wireless Telecom Services
E.21.1 MTN Group




Number of Remaining Observations = 520
679
680
E.21.3 Results from Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Normality Test Statistics
AD LF SW JB DP
MTN Group 6.2563*** 0.075503*** 0.89742*** 3559.2*** -8.2068***
Vodacom Group 3.7651*** 0.06353*** 0.95454*** 468.23*** -1.49940
*p <0.1
** p <0.05
*** p <0.01
681
